Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 50
Issue 3 Spring 2019

Article 10

2019

Whistling Past the Graveyard: Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Programs Dodge Bullets Fighting Financial Crime
Mary Kreiner Ramirez

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Whistling Past the Graveyard: Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Programs Dodge Bullets
Fighting Financial Crime, 50 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 617 ().
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol50/iss3/10

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more
information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Whistling Past the Graveyard: Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Programs Dodge Bullets Fighting
Financial Crime
Mary Kreiner Ramirez*
The United States’ reaction to the 2008 Financial Crisis, which caused
global ramifications, included the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act to address a lack of oversight and
accountability in the financial industry. Among its provisions, Dodd-Frank
provided incentives for whistleblowers to report misconduct and protections
for those who do. Despite its success, Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower programs
face internal and external challenges that threaten their success. This Article
discusses the current climate surrounding corporate accountability and
suggests additional protections for whistleblowers and whistleblower
actions: allowing private lawsuits against the government under
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions, similar to those allowed under the
False Claims Act.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis that erupted in 20081 with the freezing of credit
markets2 and collapse of Lehman Brothers3 impacted financial markets
across the globe.4 Concurrent with the recognition that government aid
would be required to quell the tidal wave of panic sweeping the financial
markets in the wake of Lehman’s collapse, came the insistence that
greater oversight of the financial markets was necessary and that reforms
should be imposed to enhance transparency in the financial marketplace
and identify catastrophic risk.5 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act6 was enacted two years after Secretary of the
1. The financial crisis spanned several years, culminating in the “profound events of 2007 and
2008” and continuing beyond those years with multiple bank failures, mortgage company
bankruptcies, and real estate foreclosures. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xv (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
This Article refers to the “financial crisis” broadly to reference this period, or at times the “financial
crisis of 2008” because 2008 is the year in which the general public became aware of the magnitude
of the crisis, beginning with the major bank collapses of Bear Stearns and of Lehman Brothers, the
takeover of Merrill Lynch, and most pointedly, when Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson went
to the President and Congress to recommend a bailout for the major banking institutions, among
others. See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 254 (2010); see, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra,
at 353.
2. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1.
3. See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 445 B.R.
143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-13555).
4. See, e.g., INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010) (documentary reviewing the breadth of
the worldwide 2008 financial crisis). The financial crisis is credited with threatening the destruction
or at least severe weakening of the Euro as some of the financially strapped countries in the
Eurozone faced the possibility of pulling out of the currency. See, e.g., R.A., The Euro Crisis: No
Way Out, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2012), https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2012/05/09/noway-out (discussing the imminent departure of Greece from the Eurozone and the possible
contagious effect this may have on the markets of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy).
5. Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2010) [hereinafter DoddFrank Hearing] (opening statement of Senator Chris Dodd).
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C, 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 12
C.F.R., 17 C.F.R. & 31 C.F.R.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
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Treasury Henry Paulson, along with the Chairperson of the Federal
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, convinced the President of the United States and
Congress that the 2008 financial crisis looming large was too urgent to
await the careful review of a legislative body that could tackle reform.7
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)8 and other financial relief9
was provided quickly and without strings attached for reform.10
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), enacted on July 21, 2010, is a sprawling piece of
legislation that addresses a multitude of issues identified in its aftermath
as contributing to the financial crisis.11 It is over 2000 pages long,12 and
7. See PAULSON, supra note 1, at 254 (describing the parties’ reaction to the 2008 financial
crisis).
8. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 371–76 (detailing the Treasury’s contribution
through TARP).
9. See David Goldman, CNNMoney.com’s Bailout Tracker, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2019)
(tracking the various federal programs to bailout the economy, using sources from the Federal
Reserve, Treasury, FDIC, CBO, and White House); Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the
Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81, 89–90 (2009) (describing the $96 billion effort to bail
out government sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the “Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program” by which the FDIC guaranteed all bank debt); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO
BIG TO FAIL 396–99 (2009) (describing that, even prior to the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) adopted by Congress in 2008, to bail out the financial markets, and despite the fact that it
was an insurance company, AIG received $85 billion from the Federal Reserve, pulling it from the
brink of bankruptcy). In all, AIG received $182 billion in federal bailout money. See Christian
Plumb, U.S. Drops Criminal Probe of AIG Executives, REUTERS (May 22, 2010, 9:02 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/23/us-aig-doj-idUSTRE64L09W20100523.
10. The bailout of banks, insurance giant AIG, GM, and the auto industry, among others, did
not save the United States from high unemployment and record housing foreclosures. See STEVEN
A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC
RULE OF LAW xvi (2013) [hereinafter LAWLESS CAPITALISM]; Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal
Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining
Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 877–78 (2013). See also Dodd-Frank Hearing,
supra note 5 (opening statement of Senator Chris Dodd).
11. The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Act states the following: “To promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system,
to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers
from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
12. See
Too
Big
Not
to
Fail,
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
18,
2012),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2012/02/18/too-big-not-to-fail (comparing the length of the
Dodd-Frank Act to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (32 pages) and the Glass-Steagall Act (37
pages) and nicknaming it “Dodd-Frankenstein” because its complexity will “encourage[] efforts to
game the system by exploiting the loopholes it inevitably creates”). Another source reports it is
2253 pages. T. Markus Funk, Getting What They Pay For: The Far-Reaching Impact of the
Dodd-Frank Act’s ‘Whistleblower Bounty’ Incentives on FCPA Enforcement, 5 White Collar Crime
Rep. (BNA) 640, 641 (Sept. 10, 2010).
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it is criticized for statutorily mandating rulemaking by numerous federal
agencies on hundreds of issues.13 Included is legislation to support
whistleblowers, as it became apparent that many insiders in the financial
industry were well aware of excessive risk-taking by banking institutions
and other financial giants and that fraudulent activity, insider trading,
Ponzi schemes, and other criminal acts were occurring. 14 The failure of
individuals to step forward to report the wrongdoing was the consequence
of hostile work environments that do not tolerate naysayers in the face of
potential monumental profits.15
The risk managers and other employees who did come forward
internally to warn their bosses of the potential for financial ruin did not
fare well. At Citigroup, Countrywide, JPMorgan Chase, and elsewhere,
they lost their positions, their staffs, their offices, and often, their jobs. 16
After the accounting crisis of 2001, when the country learned of the
failures of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, among others,
Congress addressed corporate wrongdoing with legislative reform in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).17 That reform included provisions to protect
whistleblowers to encourage them to report unlawful behavior.18 In light
13. See Too Big Not To Fail, supra note 12 (“[A]ccording to Davis Polk only 93 of the 400
rule-making requirements mandated by Dodd-Frank have been finalised. Deadlines have been
missed for 164.”).
14. MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH
PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 6, 61–65, 68–69, 71–72, 75–76, 79, 86,
88, 90–92, 94–96, 99, 120–21, 124–27, 131, 147–48, 152, 181, 183–84, 205–07 (2017).
15. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 773–74 (2018); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111
(2010); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT
WORK 172 (1985) (observing the sanctions faced in the marketplace by informants as a result of
informing on business associates); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation,
Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2003).
16. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (detailing how Richard Bowen, a manager at
CitiBank, reported risky lending activity to superiors and went from supervising 220 people to
supervising only two, had his bonus reduced, and was downgraded in his performance review); see
generally Hearing on Subprime Lending & Securitization & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. Before the
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n (2010) (testimony of Richard M. Bowen), available at http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0407-Bowen.pdf. Richard Bowen sent an
email to Jamie Dimon to draw Dimon’s attention to the risky lending activity. See 60 Minutes:
Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/830118560_162-57336042/prosecuting-wall-street/; David Benoit, Countrywide Whistle-Blower Had
Alleged Subprime Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424053111904060604576573073620596988; RAMIREZ & RAMIREZ, supra note
14, at 31–40, 47.
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 801–1107, 116 Stat. 745, 800–10
(codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter SOX].
18. Sherron Watkins’s experience at Enron is telling. Ms. Watkins waited until CEO Jeffrey
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of the financial crisis of 2008, clearly the measures developed in SOX to
encourage whistleblowing had been too limited and ineffective.19
In the financial crisis, the great risks taken in the financial industry
generated vast rewards favoring a few well-placed hedge funds and
money managers while foisting tremendous losses on the companies they
worked for, investors, the American public, and the taxpayers that bailed
out those companies.20 In an effort to provide “more help” to the SEC “in
identifying securities law violations” and in protecting investors, the
Dodd-Frank Act takes a second crack at motivating whistleblowers and
protecting them from retaliation.21 The Dodd-Frank Act clarifies and
enhances SOX whistleblower protections in light of the often steep
professional, social, and financial costs to whistleblowers that discourage
them from coming forward.22 Significantly, Dodd-Frank provides a
Skilling’s departure from Enron because she feared she would be fired, given that the company
treasurer, Jeff McMahon, was transferred after he “complained mightily” to Skilling about the “veil
of secrecy” surrounding accounting deals. Michael Duffy, By the Sign of the Crooked E, TIME (Jan.
19, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,195268,00.html. After reporting her
concerns to Ken Lay (Enron Chairman of the Board and Skilling’s replacement as CEO), Andrew
Fastow (Enron’s Chief Financial Officer) reportedly wanted her fired and her computer seized. Dan
Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, But Blew It, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2002, 3:50 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html (reporting on Watkins’s testimony before
Congress investigating Enron). Although Watkins’s computer was returned to her after her request
to transfer to another department, her work assignments were radically diminished. Kathleen F.
Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH.
U. L. Q. 357, 362–64, 363–64 nn.28–30 (2003). Finally, after Lay’s contact with Watkins, he
instructed the law firm of Vinson & Elkins to investigate Watkins’s concerns, but he also requested
an assessment of whether Watkins could be fired without repercussions to Enron. Id. at 362–63.
19. See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale
of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 202–03 (2007) (discussing narrow interpretations
of SOX legislation). When the risk of retaliation is severe, whistleblowers must have high
confidence in the precision of the legal system, with a strong institutional environment offering
effective protection from retaliation. Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino & Giancarlo
Spagnolo, Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud 23 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research,
Discussion
Paper
No.
DP12260,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3031897.
20. See generally Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Address at the
Institute of Regulation & Risk, Hong Kong: The $100 Billion Question, at 6 (Mar. 30, 2010),
https://www.bis.org/review/r100406d.pdf (asserting that the potential financial benefits to the
banks from extreme risk-taking is far exceeded by the social costs borne by the world economy
when those risky investments fail). See Goldman, supra note 9 (tracking the various federal
programs to bailout the economy, using sources from the Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC, CBO,
and White House). The Bailout Tracker also tracks the amount of funds that have been repaid by
various entities who received bailout money. Id.
21. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010); Sean X. McKessy, Chief, Office of the
Whistleblower, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at Georgetown University (Aug. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter McKessy, Remarks at Georgetown University].
22. See MANN, supra note 15, at 172 (noting the possible repercussions of being an informant);
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financial incentive to contact the SEC or CFTC, respectively, while
affording protection against retaliation through whistleblower
confidentiality and a private right of action against an employer who
retaliates.23
Part I of this Article highlights the success of the SEC and CFTC
whistleblower programs and reviews their structure. Part II describes the
obstacles faced by the SEC in the rulemaking process and the
considerations that led to such rules. Part III considers the continued
challenges to the success of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections.
Finally, Part IV offers a proposal to implement, should the current
programs falter, that circumvents some of the most likely obstacles to the
programs’ success. The Article suggests that, should narrow judicial
interpretations, resource restriction, and agency capture, among others,
hit their mark and drain the vitality of the programs, individual
whistleblowers could step into the role of private attorneys general to
prosecute the cases on behalf of the government, similar to lawsuits
brought by relators in qui tam actions under the False Claims Act.24 Even
as this proposal remains a viable addition to the whistleblower programs,
False Claims Act qui tam private lawsuits are subject to dismissal of
relator cases by Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys in cases in which
the DOJ has declined to intervene.25
Whistleblower rewards and protections offer greater oversight of the
financial markets by providing greater transparency in the financial
marketplace and enhancing detection, investigation, and recovery of
losses. Moreover, in addition to limiting the risk of investor loss through
earlier detection based on highly specific information, the program deters
Simons, supra note 15, at 29 (explaining the consequences of being a “cooperator” in an
investigation).
23. See Part I, infra, describing the details of both agency programs’ rewards and protections,
including the opportunity for whistleblowers to receive a reward of 10 to 30 percent of the monetary
sanctions when the SEC, CFTC, or related actions recover monies over $1 million due to
information reported to the agencies.
24. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 511, EVALUATION OF
THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 28–30
(2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/oig/reports/audits/2013/511.pdf [hereinafter SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
EVALUATION] (assessing that it is too soon to evaluate whether a private right of action similar to
the False Claims Act should be added to the SEC’s whistleblower program given that the program
has been operational for less than two years).
25. See Memorandum from Michael D. Granston, Dir., Commercial Litig. Branch, Fraud
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Attorneys in Commercial Litig. Branch, Fraud Section & Assistant
U.S. Attorneys Handling False Claims Act Cases, Offices of the U.S. Attorneys 1–2 (Jan. 10, 2018)
[hereinafter Granston Memorandum] (explaining the importance of dismissing False Claims Act
qui tam private lawsuits when the DOJ has declined to intervene).

2019]

Whistling Past the Graveyard

623

financial misconduct because the programs’ anti-retaliation provisions,
confidentiality rules, and potential financial rewards both protect and
incentivize whistleblowers to report securities law violations to
regulators.26 Nevertheless, maintaining and increasing success of the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower programs requires vigilance against persistent
shots at the program that threaten to kill its success.
I. THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAMS
The Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower provisions enhanced the SOX
protections27 and drew on earlier whistleblower legislation to
substantially expand incentives and protections for whistleblowers who
report investor-related financial crimes. Dodd-Frank required the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as the US
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to implement
provisions established by Congress providing whistleblowers incentives
and protection.28 Although the SEC’s Office of Whistleblower Protection
(OWB) was slow to develop, it has achieved notable successes, exceeding
$326 million dollars in total rewards to 59 individual whistleblowers
under the program, and ordering more than $1.7 billion in monetary
sanctions against wrongdoers as a consequence of the program.29 The
26. Buccirossi, Immordino & Spagnolo, supra note 19. On the deterrence effect, see Jaron H.
Wilde, The Deterrent Effect of Employee Whistleblowing on Firms’ Financial Misreporting and
Tax Aggressiveness, 92 ACCT. REV. 247 (2017) (finding that firms subjected to whistleblower
allegations show a significant decrease in financial misreporting and tax aggressiveness, and that
the “deterrence effect persists for at least two years beyond the year of the allegation”); Mary Jo
White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9,
2013), quoted in Stephen Kohn, The Problem with SEC’s Plan to Cap Whistleblower Awards,
KOHN, KOHN & COLAPINTO, LLP (July 10, 2018), https://www.kkc.com/news/?id=651 (explaining
that the SEC whistleblower provisions “deter wrongdoing by making would-be violators ask
themselves—who else is watching me?”).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (original version at SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116
Stat. 745, 802 (2002), amended by Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 922(b), (c), 929A, 124
Stat. 1376, 1848, 1852 (2010)).
28. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 924(d), 124 Stat. at 1850. See also 7 U.S.C. § 26
(2012) (commodity whistleblower incentives and protection); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (securities
whistleblower incentives and protection); § 78u-7 (implementation and transition provisions for
whistleblower protection).
29. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 1 (2018) [hereinafter SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM]; Jason
Zuckerman & Matt Stock, One Billion Reasons Why the SEC Whistleblower-Reward Program Is
Effective, FORBES (July 18, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/
2017/07/18/one-billion-reasons-why-the-sec-whistleblower-reward-program-iseffective/#7558c9023009. The OWB was established in February 2011, but the rules to implement
the program became effective on August 12, 2011. SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
EVALUATION, supra note 24, at iii. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Whistleblower
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CFTC has had an even slower start and far less success, yet it has awarded
approximately $87 million to whistleblowers since the inception of the
agency’s whistleblower program in 2012, including $75 million in
awards in the summer of 2018.30 Both offices continue to yield positive
results, using the funds collected in successful cases arising out of the
programs to fund the programs and customer education initiatives,
provide restitution to harmed investors, protect and reward
whistleblowers who provided significant information to the agencies, and
add billions of dollars in collected fines to the US Treasury. 31
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act32 amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)33 in part by adding “Securities
Receives Award of Approximately $1.5 Million (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-194.
30. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM AND CUSTOMER EDUCATION INITIATIVES 2–3 (2018) [hereinafter
CFTC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM]; CFTC Announces Multiple Whistleblower
Awards Totaling More Than $45 Million, MONDOVISIONE (Aug. 2, 2018),
http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/cftc-announces-multiplewhistleblower-awards-totaling-more-than-45-million/. The CFTC program is substantially smaller
than the SEC program. While the numbers and quality of the tips have continued to increase over
time, the first CFTC whistleblower award was in May 2014. See Jessica Tillipman, Interview with
Christopher Ehrman, Director of the CFTC Whistleblower Office, FCPA BLOG (June 11, 2014,
7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/6/11/interview-with-christopher-ehrman-directorof-the-cftc-whist.html. Until the summer of 2018, the CFTC had only issued four rewards from
1393 whistleblower tips, totaling about $10.5 million. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM AND CUSTOMER EDUCATION
INITIATIVES 4–5 (2017) [hereinafter CFTC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM]. The
CFTC received 2153 tips since its inception through the end of fiscal year 2018 and issued nine
awards overall in that time. CFTC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra, at 3–4.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g) (providing an operating fund for the SEC whistleblower program that
is funded by monetary sanctions collected in SEC enforcement actions arising from the
whistleblower program); Reports and Publications, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId=edit-tid&year=All&field_article_sub_type_secart_value=
Reports+and+Publications-AnnualReports&tid=59 (last visited Apr. 29, 2019) (reporting the
amount collected from enforcement actions arising out of the whistleblower program, including
whistleblower reward amounts, total amounts collected, and amounts turned over to the US
Treasury); Kara M. Stein, Statement on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Whistleblower
Program Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 28, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-stein-whistleblower-062818. Mary Jo
White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at Northwestern University School of Law: The SEC
as the Whistleblower’s Advocate (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-whiteremarks-at-garrett-institute.html (describing the SEC whistleblower program’s success as a “game
changer”). See also Zuckerman & Stock, supra note 29 (detailing the SEC Whistleblower-Reward
Program’s successes). See 7 U.S.C. § 26(g) (establishing the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Customer Protection Fund).
32. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841.
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
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Whistleblower Incentives and Protection” in Section 21F of the Exchange
Act.34 Section 748 of Dodd-Frank amended the Commodity Exchange
Act by adding “Commodity Whistleblower Incentives and Protection” as
Section 26.35 Section 924(d) requires the SEC to establish an office
within the SEC to administer a whistleblower program. 36 The SEC
adopted Final Rules implementing this directive, Regulation 21F,
effective August 12, 2011.37 Aside from a few very minor points, the
implementing legislation for the SEC and the CFTC is, essentially, the
same.38
Central to creating incentives for whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank Act
requires the SEC and the CFTC to pay an award to whistleblowers39 who
voluntarily provide “original information” relating to violations of the
securities laws to the SEC, or violations of Title 7, Chapter 1 to the CFTC,
that leads to the “successful enforcement of the covered judicial or
administrative action, or related action.”40 The amount of the award is
based upon the monetary sanctions imposed upon the violator in SEC
enforcement actions or related actions where such sanctions exceed
$1 million.41 The award, of not less than 10 percent, but not more than

34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
35. 7 U.S.C. § 26.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7.
37. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64,545, 101 SEC Docket 630 (Aug. 12, 2011). The CFTC’s
Final Rules became effective on October 24, 2011. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTION PROGRAM
3, 5 (2011), https://www.whistleblower.gov/sites/whistleblower/files/Reports/wb_fy2011
reporttocongress.pdf. The CFTC Whistleblower Office launched its web portal for receiving tips,
complaints, and referrals on September 10, 2012. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM AND CUSTOMER EDUCATION INITIATIVES
2
(2012),
https://www.whistleblower.gov/sites/whistleblower/files/Reports/wb_fy2012
reporttocongress.pdf [hereinafter CFTC 2012 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM].
38. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, with 7 U.S.C. § 26, and compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F (2018)
(SEC Final Rule, effective Aug. 12, 2011), with 17 C.F.R. § 165 (2018) (CFTC Final Rule, effective
Oct. 24, 2011); see also Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,172 (Aug. 25,
2011) (CFTC Final Rules).
39. See 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(7); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2018)
(defining “whistleblower” as an “individual” (not an entity) who provides the SEC “with
information pursuant to the procedures set forth in § 240.21F-9(a) of this chapter, and the
information relates to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws,” rules, or regulations, and
that “has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur”).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b); 7 U.S.C. § 26(b).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a); 7 U.S.C. § 26(a). Awards may also be based upon monetary sanctions
collected by other authorities (including self-regulatory organizations) in actions related to a CFTC
enforcement action, based upon information provided by a CFTC whistleblower.
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30 percent of the sanctions collected, is mandatory,42 although the
specific award amount is discretionary43 and based upon criteria that may
increase44 or decrease the award.45 A whistleblower can be any person
who provides the SEC or CFTC with original information about a
violation of the securities laws or a violation of the Commodity Exchange
Act, respectively, that is based upon either the person’s independent
knowledge or independent analysis.46 Finally, a whistleblower may
remain anonymous, but to be a whistleblower under the regulations, one
must file a “tip, complaint or referral” (TCR) form with the SEC or CFTC
that provides specific, timely, and credible information.47 To be eligible
for an award, the whistleblower must comply with rules that describe
procedures, and among other things, potentially provide cooperation to
develop the information or use it in proceedings.48 Furthermore, certain
categories of individuals are excluded as potential whistleblowers
eligible for an award under the Dodd-Frank Act.49
The Dodd-Frank Act provides protection to whistleblowers who
provide information pursuant to the Act by including anti-retaliation
provisions and by keeping whistleblowers’ identities confidential from
employers. The Act created a private right of action against an employer
who retaliates for any whistleblowing activities related to reporting
securities law violations to the SEC or violations of commodities laws to
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b); 7 U.S.C. § 26(b).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(b), (c) (providing the percentage criteria,
which is based in part on the criteria for determining the amount of the award as described in
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6, and if there is more than one whistleblower eligible for the award, the total
amount of the award in the aggregate will not be less than 10 percent or more than 30 percent);
7 U.S.C. § 26(c)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 165.9(a) (2018).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a) (identifying the significance of the
information and the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower, law enforcement interest
in making the award, and whether or the extent to which the whistleblower participated in internal
compliance systems, as reasons to increase the size of the award); 7 U.S.C. § 26(c)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R.
§ 165.9(b).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b) (identifying the culpability of the
whistleblower, any unreasonable reporting delay in making the report, and interference with
internal reporting procedures, as reasons to decrease the size of the award); 7 U.S.C. § 26(c)(2);
17 C.F.R. § 165.9(c).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3); 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(4).
47. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9; 17 C.F.R. § 165.3.
48. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(a), (b) (providing that cooperation may include testifying or
explaining tendered information, among other things); 17 C.F.R. § 165.5.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c) (excluding members, officers or employees of the SEC, the DOJ,
an appropriate regulatory agency, self-regulatory organization, Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, or any law enforcement organization, at the time the information was received);
17 C.F.R. § 165.6.
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the CFTC.50 The agencies may also take action independently through an
enforcement proceeding against an employer that retaliates against a
whistleblower who provides information to the agency.51 Moreover, the
protections apply even if the whistleblower fails to satisfy the
requirements, procedures, or conditions necessary to qualify for an award
under the Act.52 Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act protects whistleblower
confidentiality in two possible ways: (1) by requiring that the agency not
disclose information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the
identity of the whistleblower, except in the limited circumstances
delineated in the rules,53 or (2) by permitting the whistleblower to submit
information to the agency anonymously via an attorney representing the
whistleblower and with the understanding that the whistleblower’s
identity must be revealed to the agency prior to receiving any award.54
When drafting the Final Rules, the SEC received extensive public
comments from multinational corporations, national whistleblower
organizations, and individuals, among others.55 The comments are
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (providing for relief that may include reinstatement, double
back pay, litigation costs, expert witness fees, and attorney’s fees). The Supreme Court held in
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018), that this protection is limited to
whistleblowers who experience retaliation only after externally reporting to the SEC. See infra Part
III.A. See also 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(1)(B)(i), (h)(1)(C) (providing, under the CFTC program, similar
relief except that back pay is not doubled).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2. The Commission has used this provision to address “pre-taliation”
by employers prohibiting cooperation with government inquiries or conditioning severance pay in
employment contracts or separation agreements. See infra Part III.C. See also 17 C.F.R. § 165.19.
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(iii). Nevertheless, unless the person seeking protection under
these provisions has either reported securities violations to the Commission or the appropriately
qualified person pursuant to SOX protections (may report to the Commission, any other federal
agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor), this protection is unavailable. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc.,
138 S. Ct. at 777, 778; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1) (2012). But see Office
of the Whistleblower: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-faq.shtml#P15_4932 (last visited Apr. 29, 2019) (see
FAQ #7: “I work at a company with an internal compliance process. Can I report internally and
still be eligible for a whistleblower award?”).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(a) (providing for disclosure when
required to a defendant in connection with a federal court or administrative proceeding, or to certain
investigatory, regulatory, oversight, or enforcement authorities subject to confidentiality
requirements when determined to be “necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Exchange Act
(15 U.S.C. 78a) and to protect investors”); 7 U.S.C. § 26(h)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 165.4(a).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(b); 7 U.S.C. § 26(d)(2); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 165.4(b), 165.7(c).
55. See Comments on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml (last visited Apr. 29, 2019) [hereinafter
Comments on Proposed Rules for Implementing 21F] (providing responses to the SEC’s call for
comments in Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
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addressed in the SEC’s Final Rule.56 The Final Rule report reviews the
public comments and explains the choices for the whistleblower
program’s various provisions. Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions
were modeled upon the DOJ and IRS whistleblower programs.57 Its
provisions are also shaped by other laws that provide a historical
perspective and have significant impact on encouraging whistleblowing
as a means of detecting violations of and enforcing federal laws.58
Collectively, the statutory authorities create a patchwork of
opportunities to support whistleblowers who choose to step forward to
address questionable conduct. Each statutory scheme provides explicit
rules regarding who is protected by the legislation and who is eligible for
the awards, when awards are available. Each is administered in its own
manner,59 and deadlines vary depending upon which avenue is pursued.
Most significantly, Congress sought to improve upon the institutional
Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 63,237, 99 SEC Docket 2417 (Nov. 3, 2010)).
56. See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64,545, 101 SEC Docket 630 (Aug. 12, 2011).
57. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010). The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 created
a formal nondiscretionary mechanism for awarding whistleblowers who provide specific
substantive information leading to the detection and punishment of persons guilty of violating US
internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2012). The law required the IRS to create a
Whistleblower Office, made awards of 15 to 30 percent of the collected proceeds mandatory so
long as certain eligibility requirements were met, and added whistleblower appeal rights. See 26
U.S.C. § 7623(b); History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/history-of-the-whilstleblower-informant-program (last visited
Apr. 29, 2019). The IRS whistleblower program only applies to cases where the taxes, penalties,
interest, and other amounts in dispute exceed $2 million for an entity or, if the information pertains
to an individual, that individual’s annual gross income exceeds $200,000. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5).
The IRS Informant Claims Program is an alternative award program for cases that do not meet the
threshold dollars amounts for the whistleblower program. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a); History of the
Whistleblower/Informant Program, supra. Since March 1967, the Secretary of the Treasury had
discretionary authority to pay whistleblowers for information “for detecting and bringing to trial
and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at the same.”
26 U.S.C. § 7623(a); Whistleblower/Informant Program, supra. In 1996, an amendment added
authority to award payments for information regarding detecting underpayments of tax, and
provided for such payments to be made from the proceeds recovered, rather than from appropriated
funds. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a); Whistleblower/Informant Program, supra. Discretionary decisions as
to whether awards will be made are not reviewable. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a); Whistleblower/Informant
Program, supra.
58. See, e.g., JOHN BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS (2007); see also text
accompanying notes 224–35.
59. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers may proceed directly to court if retaliation is
alleged, whereas under SOX, the whistleblower must first pursue a claim through a detailed
administrative process. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (providing for a private right of action
for retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act), with 29 C.F.R. § 1980 (2018) (setting forth the
administrative procedures for filing a claim under SOX, its investigation, findings, review, and
administrative appeal).
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design to avoid the result of an earlier ineffective SEC whistleblower
program prior to passage of Dodd-Frank, and the narrowly construed
language of SOX whistleblower provisions.60
II. OBSTACLES TO LEGISLATION, RULEMAKING, AND IMPLEMENTATION
Despite the overwhelming impact of the financial crisis, which
exploded just in time for the impending national elections in the fall of
2008, the need to move quickly to address predicted catastrophic failures
in the financial market led to a relatively quick passage of measures to
bail out the top financial institutions in the United States that were
publicly dubbed “too big to fail.”61 General agreement existed that more
cautiously drafted legislation would be necessary to address the greater
failures in the financial marketplace and the shortcomings of the many
actors quickly identified as contributing to the financial disaster.62
Several congressional committees convened to study the crisis;63
economists,64 scholars,65 and political pundits66 weighed in to evaluate
what went wrong and what should be done to avoid repetition.
Nevertheless, once Congress sat down in earnest to pursue legislative
remedies, the financial industry began a tireless effort to derail and curtail
regulatory measures that it asserted would inhibit independent
profit-making decisions and impede business as usual.67
60. See, e.g., Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., ARB No. 08-032, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015,
2011 WL 1247202 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that SOX covers non-publicly traded
subsidiaries of publicly traded companies); R. Scott Oswald, More Protection for Whistleblowers,
SARBANES-OXLEY COMPLIANCE J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.sox.com/dsp_getFeaturesDetails.cfm?CID=2747; Ramirez, supra note 19, at 202–03.
61. See, e.g., SORKIN, supra note 9.
62. See Meghan Elizabeth King, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Amendments:
The Case Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in Section 806 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1457 (2011).
63. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1.
64. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2011); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION
ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009); NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS
ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 33–71 (2010).
65. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO
Autonomy, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 52–53 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193, 206 (2008).
66. See, e.g., Dave Itzkoff, At Radio City, a Showdown Between Maher and Coulter, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/arts/television/11deba.html?_
r=3&ref=politics (explaining how liberal pundit Bill Maher claimed the recession was caused by
“greedy bankers” while conservative commentator Ann Coulter claimed it was caused by
“yuppie-scum house flippers”).
67. Opposition to statutory reform by those who would be regulated by Dodd-Frank extended
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Little opposition to including whistleblower provisions in Dodd-Frank
reforms68 gave way to concerted opposition to the structure and
rulemaking process.69 The Dodd-Frank Act charged the SEC with
responsibility for overseeing the whistleblower program, requiring, as
discussed above, an Office of Whistleblower Protection,70 a fund to pay
out awards to eligible whistleblowers,71 and a process by which
whistleblower information could be received, reviewed, and if relevant,
pursued.72 Under the Act, the SEC was also charged with numerous other
mandates involving studies, rulemaking, and deadlines, addressing all
manner of matters central to the financial crisis.73 On November 3, 2010,
the SEC proposed Regulation 21F to implement the Dodd-Frank Act
whistleblower provisions.74
It is within this context that the Office of the Whistleblower (OWB)
was created. In February 2011, the SEC announced that Sean McKessy
well beyond any proposed whistleblower protection provisions. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, At
JPMorgan, the Ghost of Dinner Parties Past, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/jpmorgan-shooting-itself-in-the-foot-fairgame.html?_r=3 (describing the financial industry’s investment in undermining Dodd-Frank Act
provisions that required further rulemaking through intense lobbying efforts to delay rulemaking,
complicate rules proposed, and postpone effective dates).
68. See Richard Renner, CNBC Notices Whistleblower Provisions of Dodd-Frank Act,
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION BLOG (July 27, 2010), https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/
2010/07/articles/corporate-whistleblowers/cnbc-notices-whistleblower-provisions-of-dodd-frankact/ (noting that the new whistleblower provisions were not widely publicized).
69. U.S. Chamber Urges SEC to Consider Potential Consequences of Whistleblower Bounty
Program, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Nov. 2, 2010, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/pressrelease/us-chamber-urges-sec-consider-potential-consequences-whistleblower-bounty-program
(“We want a system that works, not a system of gotcha.”); Letter from Apache Corp. et. al to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-150.pdf.
70. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 924(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g) (2012).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
73. According to the SEC “the Dodd-Frank Act require[d] the SEC to promulgate more than
100 new rules, create five new offices, and conduct more than 20 studies and reports.” See U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy12congbudgjust.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
74. See Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 63,237, 99 SEC Docket 2417 (Nov. 3, 2010);
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011). The
Commission received more than 1541 letters responding to the Proposed Rules. The public
comments are available at, Comments on Proposed Rules for Implementing 21F, supra note 55. In
response to the comments and to meetings with many interested parties from nonprofit
whistleblower organizations to multinational companies, the SEC addressed many of the significant
matters raised by the letters and commentary in a detailed discussion published in the Federal
Register. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300.
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had been appointed chief for the new OWB.75 By May 2011, the SEC
established a whistleblower hotline,76 provided a link on its website for
lodging whistleblower complaints, and implemented its online
questionnaire: the Tips, Complaints and Referrals System (TCR
System).77 The SEC published its Final Rule in the Federal Register in
June 2011,78 and it became effective on August 12, 2011, just over one
year after Dodd-Frank’s enactment.79 The Commission revised the TCR
System concurrently with the effective date of the Final Rule to conform
to the Final Rule’s substantive requirements.80 Significant issues raised
and addressed in the comments to the Final Rule are common to industry
concerns about whistleblower programs in general, such as concerns that
an employee may fail to speak up within the organization at early signs
of violations because the employee is waiting until the losses are large
enough to seek a whistleblower reward, or that the whistleblower is
directing or participating in the wrongdoing.81 Other significant issues
are common concerns among whistleblowers, especially concerns about
protecting them from harm or retaliation for bringing wrongdoing to the
attention of employers or regulators. These positions remain in tension
with each other and are borne out in the litigation discussed below, and
through agency contact with the many constituencies involved in the
financial markets. Thus, even as the high-dollar successes of the
whistleblower programs are touted by regulators, continued success is not
assured.

75. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Sean McKessy Named Head of Whistleblower
Office (Feb. 18, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-47.htm.
76. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 4–5 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/files/whistleblower-annual-report2011.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2011 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM]. But see Edward Siedle,
SEC Whistleblower Office Does Not Want to Talk to You, FORBES (May 12, 2011, 11:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsiedle/2011/05/12/sec-whistleblower-office-does-not-wantto-talk-to-you/#76b08e057186 (criticizing the program for the inability of a whistleblower to
contact someone personally to communicate a tip because the only way to lodge a whistleblower
tip is to leave a message online and wait for the SEC to call you).
77. SEC 2011 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 4, 5.
78. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300.
79. The Dodd-Frank Act imposed a 270-day deadline from July 21, 2010, to issue the Final
Rule. See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64,545, 101 SEC Docket 630 (Aug. 12, 2011);
Funk, supra note 12. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission opened its Whistleblower
Office in 2012. See 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (Dodd-Frank provision directing CFTC to create a
whistleblower office); CFTC 2012 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 37, at 2.
80. See SEC 2011 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 5.
81. See supra notes 55–56.

632

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

III. DODGING BULLETS: CHALLENGES THAT COULD KILL SUCCESS
Multiple challenges threaten the success of the SEC whistleblower
program. Narrowing the scope of the legislation through judicial
interpretation, aggressive efforts by employers to limit employee
cooperation with the agencies, threats from special interest groups, limits
to funding and resources, and proposed regulatory rule changes to
undercut the programs are some of the threats to its potential for success.
The institutional design drawn up in Dodd-Frank sought to provide
credibility, legitimacy, and predictability to the programs through durable
statutes to assure awards would be made, whistleblowers would be
protected through anonymity, and anti-retaliation measures would have
consequences. Through this design, Congress intended that
whistleblowers would be incentivized to bring violations to the
regulators, protect investors, and instill confidence in the market.
Congressional effort to promote credibility can be seen in all three
elements of the whistleblower programs. Dodd-Frank includes
definitions of key terms such as who will be eligible for awards and
protection. The affirmative language setting forth the amount of the
award between 10 and 30 percent of collected monetary sanctions,
removes the agency discretion that hampered earlier SEC whistleblower
provisions and thus assures financial recovery if conditions are met. The
opportunity to report violations anonymously is explicit. Finally, the
opportunity for the agency and the individual whistleblower to bring a
private action to address retaliation assures both the offender and the
offended that protection is durable. Despite the effort, trust in the program
has been undermined, and it is up to the SEC or Congress to restore
credibility in the program. While limited in scope, this Article addresses
the ongoing fight to dodge the bullets aimed to maim the program, and
preserve the credibility of the program, enhance its legitimacy, and
promote predictability so that programs flourish.
A. Judicial Interpretation that Narrows Protections
Special interest lobbyists have threatened the SEC with potential
lawsuits to strike down the whistleblower rules.82 These are not idle
82. See McKessy, Remarks at Georgetown University, supra note 21 (asserting that he has
received several threats about lawsuits to strike down the rules and citing successful efforts against
other Dodd-Frank Act provisions); Matt Taibbi, How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform,
ROLLING STONE (May 10, 2012, 12:00 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsnews/how-wall-street-killed-financial-reform-190802/ (entitling the second step to killing
Dodd-Frank: “Sue, Sue, Sue”).
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threats. Industry opponents have enjoyed some success in using lawsuits
to undo Dodd-Frank reforms.83 The threat of such lawsuits may also
influence the development of procedures and interpretation of statutes
and rules as the agency attempts to avoid pushing the envelope and
drawing the lawsuit. Inevitably, the statutory mandates of the
Dodd-Frank Act, and the plain language of the rules, are subject to
judicial interpretation.84 As others have observed, judges have the ability
to overturn the careful and lengthy debates about which provisions should
be included in the Dodd-Frank Act, and the lengthy comment and
rulemaking process that accompanied the Final Rules.85
Borne of the corporate accounting scandals that broke at the beginning
of the millennium,86 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200287 faced legal
challenges to limit its effort to encourage whistleblowers to step forward
with information about financial corruption in publicly-traded
83. Taibbi described the strategy this way:
Wall Street’s first big win involved a small-but-important change known as the “proxy
access” rule, which made it easier for people who own stakes in a company to remove
directors from the board—giving shareholders more power to rein in corrupt or overpaid
company executives.
. . . In the case of the proxy access rule, Wall Street convinced its two favorite
lobbying arms, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, to sue the
Securities Exchange Commission over a technicality, claiming that the agency had not
done a proper cost-benefit analysis before it instituted the new rule.
Taibbi, supra note 82. After the success of this first case, the same law firm was hired by
two bank-friendly industry groups to sue the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) to stop it from implementing “position limits” in the derivatives market.
. . . But the industry sued the CFTC over the exact same issue—the supposed lack of
sufficient cost-benefit analysis—that the Chamber of Commerce used to derail the proxy
access rule.
Id. The case against the CFTC managed to stall progress on implementing the position limits as the
banking industry sought to stay implementation of the rule. Id. In both cases, the attorney
representing interests seeking to upend Dodd-Frank provisions was Eugene Scalia, son of the US
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Id.
84. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (discussing Dig. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers,
138 S. Ct. 767 (2018)); see also infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text (discussing arbitration
agreements).
85. See Taibbi, supra note 82 (observing that despite the political right-wing criticism of judicial
activism, the right wing appears to have no problem searching for judges who will overturn the
Dodd-Frank Act).
86. See FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FIGHT TO
CRIMINALIZE BUSINESS VIOLENCE 19–23 (2d ed. 2006) (highlighting the widespread corporate
accounting fraud beginning in 2001 with Enron’s collapse into bankruptcy that resulted in a loss of
$60 billion in market value for Enron, exposed $11 billion in fraud at WorldCom, and fueled
hundreds of criminal investigations yielding even more convictions and discovery of costly crimes).
87. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. V 2005).
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companies.88 The effectiveness of the provisions were immediately
undermined as administrative law judges interpreted the regulations
narrowly,89 limiting access to the protections,90 and enforcing arbitration
requirements.91 Once a narrow interpretation attaches to a rule, the parties
must wait for either a higher court to overturn it on appeal, or for
Congress to step in to remedy a misinterpretation. Enacted eight years
after SOX, the Dodd-Frank Act amended SOX Section 806 to clarify and
broaden the class of “covered employers” to include “any subsidiary or
affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of such company,” and broadened coverage to
include credit rating agencies.92
Like with the SOX legislation, litigation persists over interpreting the
new whistleblower protections applicable to securities violations. In
2018, eight years after Dodd-Frank went into effect, the Supreme Court,
in Digital Reality Trust v. Somers, resolved a circuit split in interpreting
the SEC’s definition of “whistleblower” for purposes of its
anti-retaliation provisions.93 The Court rejected the agency’s authority to
define “whistleblower” through its rulemaking process as a person who
suffered retaliation for internally reporting a violation before having the
opportunity to provide the information to the SEC.94 Ruling that the
purpose of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections was to encourage
88. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; 18 U.S.C. §1514A.
89. See King, supra note 62, at 1466–74 (describing the narrow construction of the statute and
regulations).
90. Id. at 1466–70.
91. Id. at 1470–71.
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1)(62) (2012).
93. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018). The question of whether an
individual could seek protection under the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank if that
individual had not reported a securities law violation to the SEC arose in earnest in 2013 when two
courts of appeals reached opposite results. The Fifth Circuit held that individuals must report
wrongdoing to the SEC prior to any retaliation for the Dodd-Frank protections to apply, whereas
the Second Circuit applied the anti-retaliation provisions to protect a whistleblower who had
reported violations internally and had suffered retaliation as a consequence. Compare Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA) L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the SEC’s interpretation of
the regulation must be rejected and should defer to Congress), with Berman v. NEO@OGILVY
LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (ruling that the SEC’s interpretation should be afforded
Chevron deference).
94. In response to the circuit split, the SEC issued an interpretive rule determining that an
individual was not required to submit information about a securities violation to the SEC prior to
any retaliation by an employer in response to an employee’s internal securities violation reporting
to be protected under the anti-retaliation provisions. See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower
Rules Under 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 75,592, 80
Fed. Reg. 47,829 (Aug. 10, 2015).
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making disclosures to the SEC, the Court ruled that Congress defined
“‘whistleblower’ to mean a person who provides ‘information relating to
a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.’”95
No doubt there are whistleblowers who prefer to attempt an internal
resolution to organizational misconduct, perhaps out of loyalty to the
organization or coworkers, or concern about maintaining a secure
business environment. The Supreme Court found the term
“whistleblower” unambiguous, and its conclusion was compelling once
it abandoned Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation.96
Nevertheless, it all but guarantees that an employee who would prefer to
report suspected misconduct first internally, hoping for an internal
remedy or for the organization to initiate SEC reporting, will no longer
be protected if she exercises this option and will, by necessity, either
choose to leave the organization, ignore the misconduct, or step into the
uncomfortable position of placing herself in opposition to the
organization by reporting its misconduct immediately to the SEC in order
to secure the protective umbrella of anti-retaliation whistleblower
provisions of Dodd-Frank.97 Given the number of whistleblowers who
reportedly chose to report first internally, it would appear the Court’s
interpretation has foreclosed this gentler option for would-be
whistleblowers.98 For them, this may be enough to dissuade them from
reporting misconduct, as another bullet hits its mark undercutting the
success of the whistleblower program.
B. Internal Reporting and Compliance Programs
The Digital Realty ruling is especially harsh for those whistleblowers
who relied upon the agency’s “whistleblower” definition and the rules
95. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 772 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(b)–(g)) (rejecting the broader agency definition that would protect a person who faces
retaliation after internal reporting but before reporting the violation to the SEC).
96. In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in favor of Somers, the Court affirmatively rejected
according Chevron deference to the SEC’s interpretation. Id. at 782.
97. The Court in Digital Realty Trust emphasized, in response to the Solicitor General’s
concerns, that its interpretation of “whistleblower” offers anti-retaliation protection to an employee
who reports a securities violation to both the SEC and another entity, in that the employee will not
need to prove whether the employer is retaliating on account of the SEC reporting or the other
entity reporting. Id. at 780. Moreover, “auditors, attorneys, and other employees subject to
internal-reporting requirements” under Sarbanes-Oxley retain the SOX protections and may still
acquire protection under Dodd-Frank once they report the securities violation to the SEC. Id. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(b), 7245 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2018).
98. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 779 (citing the Solicitor General’s statistic that
“approximately 80 percent of the whistleblowers who received awards in 2016 ‘reported internally
before reporting to the Commission’”).
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encouraging whistleblowers to report first internally, because that
misplaced trust leaves them without protection from retaliation that
occurred prior to contacting the SEC. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
sought to promote good corporate citizenship by urging corporations and
other organizations to develop internal whistleblower protections that
would encourage employees to bring concerns to the employer’s
attention.99 These internal compliance programs would then be
considered for their effectiveness should allegations of unlawful conduct
by employees emerge.100 One concern raised by corporations who had
invested in such compliance programs was the impact the whistleblower
program may have on discouraging employees to avail themselves of
internal compliance procedures, given the opportunity to go directly to
the SEC and potentially secure a significant financial reward for doing
so.101
Even prior to the SOX support for internal compliance programs,
employers had maintained that the law should encourage internal
reporting by whistleblowers and discourage external reporting because
the employer is in the best position to investigate the complaint and to
address it quickly.102 Employers argued that an internal investigation and
remedy would always be less costly because it would avoid negative
publicity, and more importantly, save litigation costs. 103 Whistleblowers
countered that employers are just as likely to respond to internal reporting
by firing the whistleblower quickly and covering up any existing
evidence of the wrongdoing.104
99. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Idea of “Good” Governance (Sept. 27, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch586.htm (mentioning that Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Commission’s rules and penalties are designed to guarantee that “those who act on behalf of a
company give life to the corporate conscience”).
100. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5(f), 8D1.4(b)(1) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
101. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,326
n.231 (June 13, 2011).
102. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,324. See also
Ramirez, supra note 19, at 201–02 (reviewing employer preference for an opportunity to investigate
and correct misconduct prior to it being reported to regulators).
103. See supra note 102.
104. See Buccirossi, Immordino & Spagnolo, supra note 19. See, e.g., Letter from Eileen
Morrell, Senior Corp. Fin. Prof’l, to Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Sept.
17,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4351738-173326.pdf
(containing comments to rules proposed in, Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release
No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702 (July 20, 2018), from senior corporate finance professional
whistleblower who was fired days after exhausting internal remedies required by the company).
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The SEC does not require whistleblowers to report concerns internally.
However, the Final Rules reflect a change from the proposed rules. The
2011 Final Rules encourage whistleblowers to take advantage of the
internal compliance mechanisms in appropriate circumstances by
favoring a higher reward amount if the employee participated in an
entity’s internal compliance or reporting systems, or a lower reward
amount if the whistleblower interfered with internal compliance and
reporting systems.105 First, the rule recognizes that, in determining the
amount of the award to the whistleblower, one factor that may increase
the amount of the reward is whether the “whistleblower reported the
possible securities violations through internal whistleblower, legal or
compliance procedures before, or at the same time as, reporting them to
the Commission.”106 Second, if the whistleblower reports internally, and
that report leads to self-reporting by the employer entity, which leads to
a recovery over $1 million, the whistleblower is given credit for reporting
to the employer and may still recover the 10 to 30 percent of the
sanction.107 Third, in instances when the whistleblower first reports
internally, the Final Rules extend the time period to report to the
Commission to 120 days, so that the whistleblower will be treated as
though she reported at the earlier date.108
The preference to offer a more favorable award for participating in
internal compliance systems is undermined by the US Supreme Court’s
2018 interpretation of the definition of a “whistleblower.”109 Relying
upon Dodd-Frank’s legislative history, the Supreme Court found the
purpose of the whistleblower provisions is to create incentives for
whistleblowers to supply information about securities violations to the
SEC.110 Given that the anti-retaliation protections will no longer apply,
unless the whistleblower is protected under SOX, until after a person
provides information about a violation to the SEC, this preference is no
longer reasonable.
Despite proposing amendments to conform the rules to reflect the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of who is a “whistleblower” under
Dodd-Frank, the SEC did not propose to alter 204.21F-6(a) to remove the
preferential award assessment for those whistleblowers who participate
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2018).
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4)(i).
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3).
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(7).
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018).
Id.
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in internal compliance systems.111 Instead, the proposed change is to the
retaliation protections; it would add 17 CFR 240.21F-2(d), which would
require that, for a person to receive anti-retaliation protection, they must
qualify as a “whistleblower” as defined in 240.21F-2(a) “before
experiencing retaliation.”112 But retaining the award preference could
confuse or mislead a whistleblower without counsel. The preference
should be removed from Rule 21F-6(a), especially since concurrent
reporting to the SEC is also mentioned. From the Court’s narrow
interpretation of “whistleblower,” two conclusions seem obvious. First,
no whistleblower should risk losing anti-retaliation protection by
reporting internally prior to reporting to the SEC. Second, for those
whistleblowers with pending cases claiming retaliation under the SEC
whistleblower program for acts that occurred prior to reporting to the
SEC, no relief is available under the Dodd-Frank provisions unless the
whistleblower also qualifies under SOX, which covers internal reporting.
Moreover, the SEC’s initial effort to incorporate employer’s interests by
favoring internal reporting via the potential for greater monetary rewards
to whistleblowers has resulted in exactly that which whistleblowers
feared, that is, employers are rewarded for retaliating quickly and before
the unlawful activity is reported to the SEC.
Congress could restore the credibility and predictability of the
whistleblower protections by expanding the definition of
“whistleblower” to include internal reporting by amending the statute to
adopt the SEC’s rule providing access to the anti-retaliation provisions.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation will heighten
the hopes of employers aiming to narrow the program’s incentives and
protections, while slashing the expectations of those whistleblowers who
experienced retaliation after internal whistleblowing but before reporting
violations to the Commission.
C. Pre-taliation113 and Arbitration: Gagging Potential Whistleblowers
Employers attempt to circumvent whistleblower efforts through
111. See Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg.
34,702, 34,718, 34,720, 34,704, 34,724–28, 34,747 (July 20, 2018).
112. Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at 34,720;
see also 17 C.F.R § 240.21F-2(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a).
113. This term was reportedly coined by then SEC Chief of the Whistleblower Office to
describe efforts by big business to preemptively stop whistleblowing. See Erika Kelton, The War
on Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers—How Wall Street Gags, Intimidates and Fights the Fraud
Fighters, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/
2015/01/05/the-war-on-dodd-frank-whistleblowers-how-wall-street-gags-intimidates-and-fights-
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restrictive agreements such as arbitration, confidentiality, and severance
agreements that hamper their cooperation with the SEC or protection
under Dodd-Frank.114 In addition to clarifying terminology in SOX,
Congress used Dodd-Frank to prohibit employers from enforcing
mandatory predispute agreements that require employees to submit to
arbitration regarding employment disputes over retaliation for
whistleblowing activity.115 While this amendment to SOX was a boost to
whistleblowers reporting violations covered by SOX provisions, and
although Dodd-Frank added similar antiarbitration language in the
Commodity Exchange Act, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections
for claims brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) have been interpreted
by federal courts as “not exempt from predispute arbitration
agreements.”116 Courts that reject Dodd-Frank’s amendment to SOX
prohibiting predispute mandatory arbitration provisions for violations
that are reported to the SEC under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
protections overseen by the SEC’s OWB reason that the added
prohibition appears to be limited to claims under SOX due to the
language, “arising under this section” appearing in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(e)(2).117
the-fraud-fighters/.
114. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 6–7 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-reportwhistleblower-program.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM]
(reviewing restrictive agreements). The SEC had pursued nine enforcement actions for Rule 21F-17
violations by the end of fiscal year 2018. SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra
note 29, at 18.
115. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(e)(2) (2012) (“No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the
agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”). Prior to Dodd-Frank, courts
had concluded that, in SOX cases, an employer’s mandatory arbitration agreement was enforceable
and thus prohibited employees from seeking jury trials. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d
376, 379 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming order to compel arbitration and dismiss plaintiff’s case).
116. See Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 491–92 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding that agreements to arbitrate Dodd-Frank claims are enforceable). Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(e)(2) (SOX), and 17 C.F.R. 165.19 (2018) (regulations to implement the Commission’s
whistleblower program), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012) (SEC whistleblower program).
117. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491 (holding that agreements to arbitrate Dodd-Frank claims are
enforceable); Pompliano v. Snap Inc., No. 2:17-cv-3664-DMG (JPRx), 2018 WL 3198454 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 11, 2018) (same); Wussow v. Bruker Corp., No. 3:16-cv-444-WMC, 2017 WL 2805016,
at *4–7 (W.D. Wis. June 28, 2017) (same); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 2:12-cv-05914, 2014
WL 285093, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision does
not include any prohibition against predispute arbitration agreements); Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., No.
SACV 11-00734-CJC(JCGx), 2011 WL 4442790, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (“The
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act both contain provisions that render pre-dispute arbitration agreements
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Even if an arbitration agreement restricts an individual from bringing
a private action against an employer, the SEC is not bound by that
agreement. The rules prohibit any person from taking any action to
impede an individual’s cooperation with the SEC in connection with a
possible securities law violation.118 The SEC brought its first
anti-retaliation case under this provision in 2014 against a company that
retaliated against a whistleblower who reported prohibited transactions to
the SEC. The SEC settled the retaliation claim, among others, for
$2.2 million.119 In September 2016, the SEC addressed pre-taliation
efforts by Anheuser-Busch InBev, charging it with violating
whistleblower protection laws when it entered into a separation
agreement with an employee that included a nondisclosure agreement to
prevent the employee from continuing to voluntarily communicate with
the SEC about potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
violations.120 The SEC continues to actively enforce this whistleblower
unenforceable for claims brought under these two sections. Unlike these other whistleblower
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 78-u contains no such provision.”). But see Wiggins v.
ING U.S., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1089 (JCH), 2015 WL 3771646, at *6–7 (D. Conn. June 17, 2015)
(holding that the SOX predispute arbitration ban also applies to plaintiff’s Dodd-Frank claim
because the court must consider not only the “bare text,” but also “the context in which it was
enacted and the purposes it was designed to accomplish” (quoting Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons
Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377 (2004))). Wiggins appears to be the single case applying the predispute
arbitration ban to Dodd-Frank claims.
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a) (2018). Prohibited acts include “enforcing, or threatening
to enforce, a confidentiality agreement (other than agreements dealing with information . . . related
to the legal representation of a client).” Id.
119. See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In re Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 72,393, 109 SEC Docket 430 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n June 16, 2014)
(detailing how after the employee whistleblower informed Paradigm of the SEC report, the
company removed the whistleblower from the position of head trader and stripped away
supervisory responsibilities, among other actions, that resulted in the whistleblower’s resignation).
See also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 18 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report2014.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2014 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM] (discussing the case).
120. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Anheuser-Busch InBev with
Violating
FCPA
and
Whistleblower
Protection
Laws
(Sept.
28,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-196.html. The FCPA, enacted in 1977, makes it
illegal for US persons, foreign companies registered with the SEC, and foreign companies or
persons that commit an act in furtherance of an improper payment or offer while in the United
States, to bribe officials in order to “obtain or retain business.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). In terms
of bribery, the statute uses the language “anything of value,” and it has been broadly construed.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 14–19 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf; see also Funk, supra note 12, at 2. The DOJ and the SEC share
concurrent authority for criminal prosecution or administrative FCPA enforcement. Arthur F.
Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate
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protection, bringing actions against employers who included language in
separation and severance agreements “specifically” targeting the
whistleblower incentives and protections.121 Remedies have included
civil fines, revising agreements to remove prohibited language, and
contacting former employees to inform them that the prohibited language
is unenforceable.122
In May 2017, the CFTC strengthened its anti-retaliation protections by
adopting a rule similar to the SEC’s rules that prohibit acts to impede
individuals from cooperating with the agency. The rules also permit the
CFTC to bring suit against an employer who retaliates against a
whistleblower, even if that individual is ineligible for an award under the
whistleblower program.123
Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 312 (1998) (explaining that pursuant to the FCPA a “split of enforcement
authority between the DOJ and the SEC leads to parallel and overlapping SEC and DOJ/grand jury
investigations of corporate FCPA compliance”). Despite early lack of success, the DOJ and SEC
have increased enforcement of the FCPA. See Funk, supra note 12, at 3 (reporting that FCPA
penalties and settlements have yielded billions of dollars for the US government, including a 2009
settlement in which Halliburton agreed to pay $559 million, and a 2008 agreement by Siemens to
pay $800 million to settle charges). Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions apply to activities
covered by the FCPA and have spurred insiders to come forward with reports of fraud. See SEC
2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 114, at 18 (reporting that 22 percent of
the primary securities violations for covered actions involved corporate/issuer disclosure violations,
including FCPA, accounting, and offering document violations).
121. See, e.g., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In re BlackRock, Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 79,804, 115 SEC Docket 5758 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining
there were severance agreements signed by over 1000 employees which conditioned receiving
severance payments upon waiving any right to recovery of incentives offered under the Dodd-Frank
Act); Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In re NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 79,593, 115 SEC Docket 4704 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Dec. 19, 2016) (explaining that the
employer compelled at least 246 departing employees to sign severance agreements prohibiting
them from engaging in communications that disparaged the company with the SEC and other
regulators, and that violating the agreements could cause former employees to forfeit substantially
all severance pay); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Company Settles Charges in
Whistleblower Retaliation Case (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016270.html (referencing Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, In re SandRidge Energy,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,607, 115 SEC Docket 4756 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Dec. 20,
2016), which concerned severance agreements of over 500 employees that restricted employees
“from participating in any government investigation or disclosing information potentially harmful
or embarrassing to the company”). See SEC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra
note 114, at 20–21.
122. SEC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 114, at 20–21.
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 165.19 (2018); 17 C.F.R. app. § 165.20 (2018); CFTC 2017 REPORT ON
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 30, at 3; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, CFTC Strengthens Anti-Retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers and Enhances the
Award Claims Review Process (May 22, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/pr7559-17. The new rules went into effect on July 31, 2017. Whistleblower Awards
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D. Failure to Promptly Resolve Whistleblower Award Claims
As described above, the whistleblower programs have been
tremendously successful. Key to the whistleblowers’ perspective of the
programs may be whether awards are made in due course rather than
delayed or denied routinely. Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the
SEC already had a whistleblower rewards policy in place.124 Over the
twenty-year program, only five whistleblowers were found eligible to
receive awards under the discretionary procedures.125 Central to the
failure of the SEC’s pre-Dodd-Frank whistleblower program was the fact
that awards were within the discretion of the agency, and the decisions
were nonreviewable.126 Consequently, the SEC awards program failed
miserably.127
The Dodd-Frank Act set forth a requirement that an Investor Protection
Fund be instituted from which awards will be made,128 and the Final
Rules establish the necessary steps to claim an award.129 Under
Dodd-Frank, if eligibility requirements are met, the amount of the award
must fall between 10 and 30 percent of the collected monetary
sanctions.130 Within that range, the agency has discretion, although
certain factors are identified as relevant to the decision.131 To be eligible
for an award, the total monetary sanctions adjudged must be more than
$1 million, but that total may be aggregated from several defendants. The
percentage of the award applies to the amount of collected monetary
sanctions, which could be less than $1 million on a single judgment so
long as the aggregated sanctions exceed $1 million. After the $1 million
Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 24,487 (May 30, 2017).
124. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended in 1988, “authorized the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission to award a bounty to a person who provides information leading to the
recovery of a civil penalty from an insider trader, from a person who tipped information to an
insider trader[], or from a person who directly or indirectly controlled an insider trader.”
Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702, 34,741 (July 20, 2018). The pre-Dodd-Frank
Act provisions were limited to insider trading cases, and the maximum monetary reward was 10
percent of recovered funds. Id. See Funk, supra note 12, at 2 n.5.
125. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S
BOUNTY PROGRAM, REP. NO. 474, at 5 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/files/474.pdf (explaining that
under the previous SEC Whistleblower Reward Program the SEC only made five payments totaling
$159,537 between 1989 and 2009).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 4 (concluding that “the program’s success has been minimal and its existence is
practically unknown”).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g) (2012).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10 (2018).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(b), (c).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a), (b).
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threshold, payments may be made to the whistleblower over time as more
money is collected by the SEC on the sanctions associated with the
whistleblower’s claims.132
The Office of the Whistleblower web page tab “Claim an Award”
includes links to “Notices of Covered Actions.”133 Notices of Covered
Actions provide information on each “SEC action where a final judgment
or order, by itself or together with other prior judgments or orders in the
same action issued after July 21, 2010, results in monetary sanctions
exceeding $1 million.”134 Posting the Notice does not imply that a
whistleblower will be eligible to receive an award. 135 Under the Final
Rule, the SEC is not obligated to provide notice to whistleblowers that a
judgment has been entered on a matter to which the whistleblower’s
information contributed to the successful result.136 A whistleblower may
sign up to receive electronic notices when new Notices of Covered
Actions are posted on the agency’s website, but it remains the
whistleblower’s responsibility to review the website for any related
notices.137 Once posted, the rules provide a ninety-day window in which
the whistleblower may apply for an award.138 An award may be denied
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5(b), (c) (stating that the percentage is based in part on the criteria for
determining the amount of the award as described in 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6, and if there is more
than one whistleblower eligible for the award, the total amount of the award in the aggregate will
not be less than 10 percent or more than 30 percent).
133. See Claim an Award, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION: OFF. WHISTLEBLOWER (Aug.
26, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-awards.shtml [hereinafter Claim an Award].
134. See id. July 21, 2010 is the effective date of the Dodd-Frank legislation. Information
provided to the SEC prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act is not eligible for an award under
the program, but information supplied in writing to the SEC after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted
but prior to the effective date of the Final Rules is potentially eligible for awards provided the tipster
submits a claim pursuant to the process described in the Final Rules. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.21F-4(b)(1)(iv), 240.21F-10; SEC 2011 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra
note 76, at 6 n.12; Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION: OFF.
WHISTLEBLOWER
(Oct.
29,
2018),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owbfaq.shtml#P15_4932. Telephonic information is excluded because it is not in writing and not all
telephone calls provide information about potential securities law violations; moreover, the SEC
also receives tips from individuals who are not eligible for awards or do wish to be considered for
awards, but the report does not provide an accounting of such tips nor include them in the
appendices. See SEC 2011 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 5 n.10.
135. See Claim an Award, supra note 133 (“The inclusion of a Notice means only that an order
was entered with monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.”).
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10.
137. See SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 12; Claim an
Award, supra note 133.
138. See Claim an Award, supra note 133. An individual applies for an award by submitting a
completed Form WB-APP to the Office of the Whistleblower. See SEC 2018 REPORT ON
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 13.
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because it is filed out of time.139
Providing a format through which any person who believes he has
contributed to the successful collection of monetary sanctions can submit
a claim is useful. This is because claims for awards are not limited to
selection of recipients solely through the assessment of agency personnel,
especially given that staff turnover at the agency could hamper
identification of all potential eligible whistleblowers. Nonetheless, the
narrow requirements may also be viewed as additional obstacles that put
the onus on the whistleblowers to continuously check up on cases that
may have begun years earlier or for which monetary sanctions continue
to be collected years later, in order to gain the benefit of the award. The
agency may also contact whistleblowers who provided substantial
assistance throughout the investigation, but it is not obligated to do so.
The rules are clear that responsibility for filing an award claim remains
with the whistleblower.140
If timely filed, the claim is reviewed by SEC OWB staff, who make a
written recommendation regarding whether to grant or deny an award by
applying the eligibility standards. If the recommendation is positive, SEC
OWB staff apply the criteria for determining the amount of award set
forth in the rules to assess the percentage of the award.141 A Claims
Review Staff composed of senior SEC enforcement officers reviews the
recommendations and issues a Preliminary Determination assessing
whether to grant an award, and if so, the amount of the award.142 Once
issued, the award applicant has thirty days to submit a written request for
a copy of the record upon which the determination was based and to
request a meeting with OWB. The applicant has a limited period in which
to object to the preliminary determination. The preliminary determination
may be reconsidered, but eventually the Claims Review Staff will send a
Proposed Final Determination to the Commission for review and a Final
Order.143 Claimants have thirty days to appeal a Final Order denying an
139. See SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 13. See, e.g.,
Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 77,368, 113 SEC
Docket 3715 (Mar. 14, 2016), pet. for rev. denied sub nom. Cerny v. SEC, 707 F. App’x 29 (2d
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2005 (2018) (mem.).
140. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(b); SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra
note 29, at 13.
141. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6; SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra
note 29, at 13.
142. See SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 13–15
(illustrating the review and analysis of award claims, how preliminary determinations are issued,
and how final orders are issued).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10 (setting forth procedures for making a whistleblower award claim
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award to the appropriate federal court of appeals.144
The programs’ success depends upon certainty, and that certainty is
undermined because the rewards promised to whistleblowers are slow to
materialize. The tip is only the beginning of the process, and a
whistleblower understands that it may never result in meeting the $1
million baseline to even become a covered action. As the number of tips
to the agency increase, more resources are needed to review those tips.
Promising tips are sent out to the agency’s enforcement division for
investigation; if violations are confirmed, the agency or related agencies
must either litigate or reach a settlement before any monetary sanctions
are imposed. Once collected, if monetary sanctions meet the
million-dollar threshold, the notice of covered action is listed on the
agency website, the whistleblower or whistleblowers must file for a
claim, and the claim is reviewed through the process described above.
Award applications have reportedly lingered for years without agency
resolution due in part to an absence of a timeline for the agency’s review
of applications, despite the rigid timeline imposed upon applicants. The
SEC came under fire in 2015 when a whistleblower filed a lawsuit against
the agency criticizing a three-year backlog in the agency’s review of
award applications that was allegedly delaying whistleblower awards.145
In May 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that 247 of the 297
whistleblowers who applied for an award since the OWB opened in 2011
had not yet received a final decision from the SEC.146 Even though tips
have continued to increase year over year, leading to increased SEC
inquiries, the process had stalled, causing experts to raise concerns that
the backlog would discourage whistleblowing in the long run.147 The
lawsuit was terminated in 2016, when the anonymous whistleblower
notified the DC Circuit court that the SEC had responded to the
whistleblower’s application.148 Although the SEC maintained that its
in SEC actions); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-11 (related actions).
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13.
145. See C. Ryan Barber, Whistleblower Challenges SEC Over Award Claim, NAT’L L.J. (Dec.
18,
2015),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202745246520/?slreturn=
20190403121722; Rachel Louise Ensign & Jean Eaglesham, SEC Backlog Delays Whistleblower
Awards, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2015, 11:44 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-backlog-delayswhistleblower-awards-1430693284.
146. See Ensign & Eaglesham, supra note 145 (noting that roughly 83 percent were still
awaiting decisions on award applications).
147. Barber, supra note 145.
148. C. Ryan Barber, SEC Responds to Whistleblower Who Challenged Agency Delay, NAT’L
L.J. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.law.com//nationallawjournal/almID/1202749155207/SECResponds-to-Whistleblower-Who-Challenged-Agency-Delay/?slreturn=20160724012824.
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preliminary determination regarding the whistleblower’s award was
“serendipitous,” it also meant the SEC was not forced to account publicly
for the long delays in assessing whistleblower fee award petitions.149
The slow payouts have continued with the Wall Street Journal
reporting that from 2014 through 2017, the delays averaged over two
years and had been as long as four years based on a sample of award
decisions. So, the awards process “lasts longer than the average time it
takes to investigate and close an enforcement case.”150 Even though the
OWB established quantitative performance measures early on, such as
the “average length of time to respond to applications of awards filed by
whistleblowers,” it would appear it did not adopt the SEC OIG’s
recommendation to establish and incorporate “meaningful performance
metrics” that measure process performance,151 despite the exacting
standards placed on the whistleblower award applicants. The failure to
establish key performance metrics for the agency has left whistleblowers
who rose to the incentive to report violations in a state of limbo waiting
for justice delayed through agency inaction.
The reasons offered for the backlog range from inadequate resources
to review award applications to excessive incentives prompting an
increase in whistleblowing tips and complaints. Every year since the
OWB opened, the number of tips and award applicants has risen.152
149. Id. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2015) [hereinafter SEC 2015 REPORT ON
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM] (showing that more than 120 whistleblower award claims were
submitted in fiscal year 2015).
150. Dave Michaels, SEC Whistleblower Payouts Slow Amid Deluge of Reward Seekers, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-whistleblower-payouts-slowamid-deluge-of-reward-seekers-1533474001.
151. See SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM EVALUATION, supra note 24, at 21
(concluding that OWB developed “an internal control plan that identifies several quantitative and
qualitative key performance measures”).
152. The SEC reports that from fiscal years 2012 to 2018, the number of whistleblower tips has
grown by nearly 50 percent from 3001 to 5282, climbing steadily every year, to over 28,000 in
total. SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 20. Fiscal Year 2012
was the first full year the OWB was operational. Id. From fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2018,
the CFTC also received whistleblower tips and complaints at an increasing rate, from 138 tips in
fiscal year 2013 to 760 tips in fiscal year 2018, for a total of over 1600 tips. See CFTC 2018 REPORT
ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 30, at 4. The CFTC WBO received 74 whistleblower
award claims during fiscal year 2017, but no awards were paid out in fiscal year 2017. See CFTC
2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 30, at 6. In fiscal year 2018, over
$75 million collectively has been paid to a handful of claimants. Press Release, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Announces Multiple Whistleblower Awards Totaling More than
$45 Million (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7767-18. Despite the
historical upward trajectory in CFTC receipt of whistleblower tips, the number of enforcement
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Given the yield for the agency and the benefit to investors, one would
expect that more resources would be directed to the office.153
Some market participants and agency leadership suggest that the
prominent announcements of multimillion-dollar whistleblower awards
has drawn out “[f]rivolous reward seekers” whose claims distract the
agency from and delay awards to legitimate claimants. 154 Yet, the
well-publicized success of the program, and especially its large awards,
directly serve the purpose of the whistleblower program by incentivizing
whistleblowers to report violations to the SEC.155 In June 2018, the SEC
filed for notice and comment Proposed Amendments to the OWB rules
that would bar award applicants who have abused the claims process by
either making repeated frivolous award claims or who have submitted
false information to the Commission, and permit summary dispositions
for award claims that fail to meet procedural rules requirements. 156 It
would appear that while frivolous filers may file a number of claims, the
actual number of individuals behind such filings is low, with the OWB
reporting that two claimants were responsible for 221 award claims.157 If
adopted, it remains to be seen whether this type of change in the rules
will have any meaningful impact on the SEC to bring down the backlog
to reasonable levels without imposing specific timelines on the agency
actions brought by the agency dropped significantly from FY 2016 to FY 2017, with 30 percent
fewer actions and $412 million in monetary sanctions relative to the $1.29 billion obtained in fiscal
year 2016. Zach Brez, Allison Lullo & Giselle Sedano, CFTC 2018 Enforcement: Where the Puck
Is Going, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal
/sites/newyorklawjournal/2018/01/26/cftc-2018-enforcement-where-the-puck-is-going/.
153. See Zuckerman & Stock, supra note 29.
154. See Michaels, supra note 150.
155. See SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM EVALUATION, supra note 24, at iv, v,
12–14 (finding, in response to Congress’s directive to assure progress, that the OWB is
appropriately promoting and publicizing the SEC’s whistleblower program).
156. See Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg.
34,702, 34,704–05, 34,749 (June 8, 2018) (citing and proposing amendments to 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-8); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Whistleblower Rule
Amendments (June 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-120 [hereinafter
Press Release, Proposed Amendments].
157. In May 2014, the Commission denied 143 award claims from a single individual, having
previously denied 53 award claims from that same individual, while only 19 other award claims
had been denied by the end of fiscal year 2014. SEC 2014 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM,
supra note 119, at 14, 19. In August 2015, the Commission denied 25 award claims from a different
single individual, for a total of 291 claim award denials relating to two frequent award applicants.
SEC 2015 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 149, at 14. Together, the two
claimants filed 221 of the 415 award claims reportedly decided by the Commission between 2012
and 2017. See Michaels, supra note 150 (containing Wall Street Journal’s analysis of SEC releases
from 2012 to 2017).
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for the claims review process as was recommended previously by the
OIG. As Charles Grassley, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
and perennial supporter of whistleblower rights has stated, “[T]he
Commission’s Proposed Rule fails to adequately address the long delays
experienced in whistleblower cases that are not frivolous. Should the
Commission allow these long delays to persist, the resulting lengthy
award determination process could deter future potential
whistleblowers.”158 Predictability is critical to institutional design. If
whistleblowers perceive that decisions will be inconsistent or
unreasonably delayed, and if it seems that the agency cannot be depended
upon to resolve cases promptly, whistleblowers will discount the award
incentive and factor that discount into whether the risk of whistleblowing
outweighs the uncertainty of the benefits.159
E. Congressional Underfunding
An alternate explanation for the backlogs could be the SEC OWB’s
lack of resources. Congressional underfunding is a challenge across the
agency. Funding and resources have not reached the levels anticipated by
the Dodd-Frank legislation.160 In the years leading up to the financial
crisis—fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007—SEC funding was held flat or
declined, and it lost 10 percent of its personnel.161 Even as the workforce
at the SEC shrunk, its responsibilities rapidly expanded.162 In fiscal year
158. Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., to Hon. Jay Clayton,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Regarding Amendments to the SEC’s Whistleblower
Program Rules 7 (Sept. 18, 2018) (footnote omitted), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1618/s71618-4373264-175545.pdf.
159. See Michaels, supra note 150 (noting that one whistleblower still awaiting a final decision
on an award claim remarked, “Having a system that is slow is the same thing as having a system
that is not fair.”).
160. In March 2010, a few months prior to Dodd-Frank’s passage, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated changes in direct spending for the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
Estimated Budgetary Authority of $1.5 billion for 2011 and for 2012. See U.S. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, S. 3217, COST ESTIMATE: RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010 8
(2010) (anticipating budgetary needs for agencies impacted by proposals that eventually became
the Dodd-Frank Act).
161. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2
(2010) (highlighting that limited resources “severely hamper[ed] key areas such as the agency’s
enforcement and examination programs”).
162. See id. (“Since 2005, the number of investment advisers registered with and overseen by
the SEC has grown by 32 percent, and the number of broker-dealer branch offices has grown by 67
percent. The SEC oversees a total of more than 35,000 registrants, including over 10,000 public
companies, 7,800 mutual funds, about 11,500 investment advisers, 5,400 broker-dealers, 600
transfer agents, 12 securities exchanges, 10 nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
(NRSROs), and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such as the Financial Industry Regulatory
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2009, the agency’s workforce was still about 1 percent short of the fiscal
year 2005 level.163
In fiscal year 2009, the SEC’s budget was $960 million.164 In 2010,
the agency’s budget increased to $1.2 billion.165 With passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the SEC sought to hire 800 new employees to
implement new responsibilities assigned to it, including the directive to
open an Office of the Whistleblower, and create rules for its
implementation and operation.166 Instead, key House Republicans who
had opposed the Dodd-Frank Act also opposed budgetary increases to the
SEC and the CFTC.167
In February 2011, the SEC sought to increase its budget to
$1.407 billion for FY 2012, an increase of $264 million over the agency’s
FY 2011 budget. It also sought to increase hiring by 780 positions to meet
its core mission, continue to implement the Dodd-Frank Act mandates,
and expand its information technology systems.168 Included in the budget
request, the agency sought to add 43 positions to the whistleblower
program “principally to expand investigations of tips received from
whistleblowers.”169 The agency reported that only the Office of the
Whistleblower, one of the five new offices mandated by the Dodd-Frank
Act, had been implemented, and more resources were needed to establish
those offices.170
The SEC Office of Inspector General (OIG) released an October 2018
statement on the SEC’s management and performance challenges that
contrasts the increasing responsibilities of the agency over the last five
years with the decline in the agency’s overall staffing level due to an
appropriation that “has remained essentially flat since FY 2016[, and] a
hiring freeze that continued throughout FY 2018 [resulting in] a decline[]
Authority, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. While other financial regulators have close to parity between the number of staff and the
number of entities they regulate, in recent years SEC staffing and funding simply have not kept
pace with industry growth.”).
163. See id. (FTE’s (full time equivalent) positions remained under 2005 levels by thirty-five
positions).
164. See Jim Puzzanghera, SEC Chief Warns Against Budget Cuts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/05/business/la-fi-sec-schapiro-20110205.
165. Id.
166. Id.; Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 924(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1850 (2010).
167. Puzzanghera, supra note 164.
168. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 73, at 2 (stating that, of the 780 positions, 612
would be full-time equivalents).
169. See id. at 3 (explaining the responsibilities that the new positions would undertake).
170. See id. at 8.
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from 4,689 positions at the beginning of the hiring freeze to 4,459
positions at the end of FY 2018 (or about 5 percent).”171
One would expect the number of whistleblower tips and complaints to
rise along with the higher volume of entities subject to agency oversight.
With a decline in overall SEC staffing and consequently less oversight
capability, there is a greater likelihood that violations will not be
identified by regulators, and there is more opportunity for whistleblowers
to report securities violations. Staffing at the SEC OWB is far below the
forty-three positions sought by the agency to staff the office for FY 2011.
Since FY 2012, the OWB has had a chief, deputy chief, one
administrative assistant, as well as staff attorneys and paralegals. Staffing
has increased slightly from FY 2012 to FY 2018, rising from eight
attorneys and three paralegals to eleven attorneys and four paralegals.172

171. See Memorandum from Carl W. Hoecker, Inspector Gen., to Jay Clayton, Chairman,
Regarding The Inspector General’s Statement on the SEC’s Management and Performance
Challenges 1 (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Inspector-Generals-Statement-on-the-SECsMgt-and-Performance-Challenges-Oct-2018.pdf. The description of the changing markets and
increasing responsibilities of the SEC is breathtaking:
The [agency] is charged with overseeing more than 26,000 registered market
participants, including investment advisers, mutual funds, exchange-traded funds,
broker-dealers, municipal advisors, and transfer agents. The agency also oversees 21
national securities exchanges, 10 credit rating agencies, and 7 active registered clearing
agencies, as well as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. In
addition, the SEC is responsible for selectively reviewing the disclosures and financial
statements of more than 8,000 reporting companies.
. . . [I]n the last 5 years, the number of registered advisers has grown by more than
15 percent and the assets under management of these firms has increased by more than
40 percent. In addition, both the scope and number of clearing agencies required to be
examined by the SEC have grown, and the registration of municipal advisors has added
responsibility for hundreds of additional registrants with increasingly complex business
lines. At the same time, there has been rapid growth in distributed ledger (i.e.,
blockchain) technologies and in the cryptocurrency markets, and the SEC has reported
that cyber threats in securities markets have continued to increase in both frequency and
sophistication.
Id.
172. See SEC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 114, at 6 (eleven staff
attorneys, four paralegals); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 6 (2016) (eleven staff attorneys, five paralegals);
SEC 2015 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 149, at 6 (ten staff attorneys, five
paralegals); SEC 2014 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 119, at 6 (nine staff
attorneys, three paralegals); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 5 (2013) (nine staff attorneys, three
paralegals); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 2 (2012) (eight staff attorneys, three paralegals).
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Limited resources to fund and train staff also risk the security of the
whistleblower program because extensive training is required to
implement the program effectively. 173 A widely-publicized early report
of an “inadvertent” disclosure of a whistleblower’s identity,174 for
example, erodes the promise of anonymity, an important feature for those
contemplating whether to provide information of securities violations to
the SEC. Such careless errors are believed to have undermined the SEC’s
predecessor whistleblower program for insider trading information.175
Even as the SEC struggles to secure sufficient funding to meet its
historical responsibilities, staff for new oversight duties imposed by the
Dodd-Frank Act, and modernize to address a changing, global financial
market with far greater complex transactions and computerized trading,
it is important to note that increases in SEC spending would be fully
offset by increased SEC collections of fees on securities transactions and
registrations.176 One provision of the Dodd-Frank Act limited the amount
173. See SEC 2011 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 4. The ability to
report anonymously is critical to the success of the program because about half of the
whistleblowers who received awards from the SEC program reported their tips anonymously. See
Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702, 34,715
(July 20, 2018). The Dodd-Frank Act expressed concern for the protection of whistleblowers from
retaliation and mandated that whistleblower privacy be a feature of the rules, but the rules also
provide for the possibility that anonymity will not be able to be maintained. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(d)(2)(B), 6(h)(2) (2012). Once an employer becomes aware that there is a suspected
unidentified whistleblower in the ranks, there is a risk that the employer will take measures to
uncover the disruptor. The SEC settled an action against HomeStreet, Inc. that alleged a violation
of Rule 21F-17, in part due to its announcement that it could deny indemnification for legal costs
to the suspected whistleblower, an act that could impede the whistleblower’s cooperation with the
agency. See SEC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 114, at 19–20.
174. See, e.g., Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, Source’s Cover Blown by SEC, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 25, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230345900457736
3683833934726.html (reporting that the SEC “inadvertently” disclosed a whistleblower’s identity
when an SEC attorney showed notes to an executive at Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, the subject
of the whistleblower’s tip, and the executive recognized his handwriting).
175. See, e.g., Memorandum from H. David Kotz, Inspector Gen., to James Clarkson, Acting
Reg’l Dir., N.Y. Reg’l Office, Regarding Referral of Report of Investigation: Case OIG-501,
Disclosure of Nonpublic Information (Mar. 30, 2009) (finding that in 2004, SEC New York
Regional Office Enforcement attorney disclosed nonpublic information, namely the name of an
employee whistleblower to the employee’s employer, JPMorgan Chase, and that the JPMorgan
Chase employee was subsequently fired); Pogo Letter to SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro Regarding
Inspector General Recommendations for Disciplinary Action, POGO (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.pogo.org/letter/2011/03/pogo-letter-to-sec-chairman-mary-schapiro-regardinginspector-general-recommendations-for-disciplinary-action/.
176. See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-itseffectiveness.html?_r=1 (emphasizing that “the S.E.C. isn’t financed by tax revenue, but rather by
fees levied on those it regulates, which include all the big securities firms”).
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of fees the SEC may collect to the amount budgeted by Congress, so
limits on the SEC budget actually inure to the benefit of the entities
regulated by the SEC that would otherwise be required to pay more
fees.177 Providing a stronger budget would actually reduce the deficit and
compensate victims because any judgments collected may be paid to
investors who were harmed or to the US Treasury.178
Beyond question, the OWB pays its own freight, awarding a total of
over $326 million to a total of 59 whistleblowers, and obtaining monetary
sanctions of over $1.7 billion in connection with the SEC whistleblower
program between 2012 and September 2018.179 Notably, the information
received via the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program suggests that the tips
are of high quality.180 Consequently, the need to evaluate tips, and follow
up on the information provided in order to exploit the value of the tips
would suggest that personnel devoted to this program would yield
returns.181
The financial success of the program and the backlog of claims
reported in 2015 and 2016, continuing through 2018, justifies fully
funding the office. Expanding the staff of the OWB would at once resolve
the issue of backlogs and presumably allow for greater attention to the
variety of tips that are submitted. Given that a single tip could result in
177. Id. (“[C]utting its requested budget by $222.5 million saves Wall Street the same amount,
and means regulated firms will pay $136 million less in fiscal 2012 than they did the previous year,
the S.E.C. projects.”).
178. Id. (In 2010, “the S.E.C. turned over $2.2 billion to victims of financial wrongdoing and
paid hundreds of millions more to the Treasury, helping to reduce the deficit.”).
179. See SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 1, 16;
Zuckerman & Stock, supra note 29. The Commission’s Investor Protection Fund (IPF) was
established by Dodd-Frank to fund the whistleblower program, including paying awards. Until
fiscal year 2018, it had never required replenishing from the agency budget due to the substantial
monetary sanctions that have been collected and the interest that is earned on the fund; in 2018, the
SEC changed how the balance of the fund is calculated. By statute, the fund is replenished whenever
it falls below $300 million, and it did so in 2018 by less than 1 percent. See SEC 2018 REPORT ON
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 29 n.51, 29–30. The IPF also funds the
Commission’s OIG suggestion program. Id. at 29 n.49.
180. Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman:
Opening Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 2—Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm (stating that the quality of
whistleblower tips has significantly improved since the passage of Dodd-Frank).
181. As of September 2018, the SEC OWB was tracking over 900 matters in which a
whistleblower’s tip had caused a matter to be opened or expanded. Although not all tips will yield
enforcement actions or monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million, “whistleblower tips that are
specific, credible, and timely, and which are accompanied by corroborating documentary evidence,
are more likely to be forwarded to investigative staff for further analysis or investigation.” SEC
2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 24.
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monetary sanctions of millions of dollars, one profitable tip is all that is
required to sustain doubling the staff devoted to the OWB. Failure to fund
staffing undermines the effectiveness of the program since
whistleblowers will not risk stepping forward with information if the
perception is that it will be ignored.182 Moreover, the program will not
deter unlawful conduct if the likelihood that a whistleblower will be
rewarded for reporting misconduct is low.183
F. Cognitive Capture & Revolving Doors: Pre- and Post-Agency
Employment
Cognitive capture and revolving doors will necessarily impact the
success of the whistleblower program. Special interest lawsuits and stall
tactics, narrow judicial interpretations, pro-management rulings, and
stealth attacks in the form of congressional underfunding all have the
potential to undermine or even destroy the success of the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower program, but each of these is external to the SEC.
The SEC has responsibility for overseeing some of the most
complicated aspects of the financial system, and to be effective, the
Commission requires employees with expertise, who understand the
businesses they oversee, and who comprehend the transactions they
review. Consequently, the agency often hires individuals with experience
in the securities industry, especially for critical positions of authority.184
The SEC is governed by five commissioners, one of whom is designated
chair, and all of whom are appointed by the President of the United States
to serve staggered five-year terms.185 In an effort to avoid partisanship,
no more than three commissioners may belong to the same political
party.186 Nonetheless, over time, as new commissioners are appointed,
182. See supra note 19.
183. The SEC OIG conducted a review of the whistleblower program in January 2013 pursuant
to Section 922 of Dodd-Frank directing the OIG to assess various objectives, including the
promptness of the OWB in communicating with whistleblowers. See SEC OIG 2013
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM EVALUATION, supra note 24, at iv–v, 21–22. See also Michaels,
supra note 150 (arguing that the SEC’s two-year timeframe to process a case may deter
whistleblowers).
184. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Revolving Door at S.E.C. Is Hurdle to Crisis Cleanup, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2011, 9:54 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/revolvingdoor-at-s-e-c-is-hurdle-to-crisis-cleanup/ (quoting John C. Coffee Jr. who stated, ‘“The revolving
door is such a dominant fact about the S.E.C.’s culture,’ . . . . ‘You get people who go to Washington
for one to three years and then go back to Wall Street.’”).
185. See Current SEC Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 17, 2013),
www.sec.gov/Article/about-commissioners.html. The commissioner appointments are with the
advice and consent of the Senate. Id.
186. Id.
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the balance tends toward the party in power, and priorities within the
agency may shift along with the political winds. This shifting leadership
can threaten the predictability of programs under its authority.
Additionally, the limited duration of their appointments guarantee that
they will move back into the industry from which they were likely drawn.
Their preexisting allegiances are likely to impact their leadership.187
These connections give rise to cognitive capture188 that may be simply
emotional, in that agency leaders are willing to provide special
opportunities to meet with prior colleagues or associates, or they could
be more significant in that the agency employee played an active role in
a matter under investigation, a related matter, or a matter of similar
substance to one under investigation.189 Such connections may at best
cloud judgment, but at worst identify a conflict of interest or the
appearance of a conflict that may ultimately impede the mission of the
agency.190 Some such connections may be obvious to coworkers, such as
187. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 184 (reporting that Adam Glass, who joined the SEC in 2009
and became co-chief counsel in 2011, previously served as outside counsel to a major New York
hedge fund that made billions shorting the subprime mortgage market, and in one widely reported
derivative deal (termed “Abacus”), the hedge fund was permitted to select some of the transactions
that formed the basis of Abacus, intending to short the deal—that is, betting that the deal would
fail; the firm paid $550 million to settle the case with the SEC, without admitting or denying guilt).
188. See LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 37 (“[T]he increase in [the concentrated
elites’] access to resources leads to increased access to political leaders, with all the consequent
implications regarding cognitive and cultural capture.”); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Oversight and
Rule Making as Political Conflict, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 479,
486–87, 489 (Shanna R. Van Slyke, Michael L. Benson & Francis T. Cullen eds., 2016) (“The
revolving-door temptation to please potential employers and the affinity with the industry one plans
to join or rejoin emerges within the regulatory ranks as well.”).
189. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 184 (discussing the case of Adam Glass, an SEC lawyer who
testified against a mortgage investment, “Abacus,” on which Glass signed off before joining the
SEC).
190. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs (U.S.A.O. E.D. Tex.),
Former Head of SEC Fort Worth Enforcement Program Agrees to Settlement with Department of
Justice for Violation of Federal Conflicts of Interest Statute (Jan. 13, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/reppubs/other/sec_oig_pressrelease_1_13.pdf;
Edward Wyatt, Ex-Official at S.E.C. Settles Case for $50,000, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/business/ex-sec-official-settles-conflict-case.html (reporting that
Spencer Barasch, former enforcement director for the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional office from
1998–2005, who was accused of discoursing or blocking three investigations into the alleged Ponzi
scheme by Stanford Financial Group during his SEC tenure, agreed to a civil fine for violating
federal conflict-of-interest rules by later representing Stanford Financial Group before the
Commission); Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Hid Its Lawyer’s Madoff Ties, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/business/sec-refers-ex-counselsactions-on-madoff-to-justice-dept.html (reporting that the SEC’s inspector general referred to the
Justice Department the actions taken by the SEC’s general counsel David M. Becker after rejoining
the SEC in 2009, recommending a compensation plan for the victims of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi
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dealing with a former employer, but other connections may not be
apparent to anyone but the agency employee. The desire to protect prior
professional decisions that may now be perceived as unlawful conduct
could lead to actions as simple as declining to investigate a high-quality
tip, or actions as underhanded as revealing the identity of a
whistleblower.
The SEC has many responsibilities. Resources can be rearranged and
shifted among those responsibilities as priorities change from one
administration to the next or as one manager is replaced with another.
The fact that personnel changes are inevitable and those working for the
agency are well aware they may one day wish to be hired in a private firm
may undermine the commitment of personnel to the goals of the
agency.191 One of the ways in which industries capture the interests of
the agency is to offer financially rewarding job opportunities to those
personnel who demonstrate their talent in investigating and pursuing
enforcement actions on behalf of the SEC.192 By hiring such talent away
from the agency, not only is the agency deprived of the talent, but
depending upon the status of the case, a switch in personnel could delay
or even derail an investigation, especially in circumstances where there
are limited resources within the agency and the cost of getting up to speed
on the case must be weighed against other personnel commitments.
The challenge of cognitive capture and revolving-door personnel can
easily undermine the legitimacy of the whistleblower program if
whistleblowers perceive the regulator’s relationship as too cozy with
industry employers, because agency decisions will be viewed skeptically.
Should that perception persist, it undercuts incentives to move forward
with reporting securities violations.
G. Proposing Agency Rules that Undermine the Whistleblower
Programs193
Industry efforts to undermine legislative goals in enacting Dodd-Frank
scheme that was favorable to Becker’s personal interests in an inheritance from a Madoff account).
191. See Ramirez, supra note 188, at 486–87, 489.
192. See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:00
PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-179414/
(discussing how more than a dozen high-ranking SEC officials have gone on to work at Wall
Street).
193. This Section considers some of the recent proposed changes to the SEC whistleblower
program. It does not review recent changes to the CFTC whistleblower program, including the
decision by the CFTC to halt whistleblower awards throughout fiscal year 2017 while it considered
changes to the rules. See CFTC 2017 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 30, at
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can be resuscitated in later legislation to amend Dodd-Frank and in
lobbying for changes to agency rules if the statute leaves rulemaking to
agency discretion.194 The SEC has proposed rule changes, some of which
risk undermining the program.195 One proposed change that has attracted
considerable attention during the comment period, which ended in
September 2018, involves enhanced discretion by the Commission to
limit the extremely high-value awards to some whistleblowers.196
Although this proposal, along with others, remains under consideration
at the time of this writing, the comment period has ended, and the
proposals represent potential internal bullets that could harm the
whistleblower program. Even if the proposed changes are not adopted,
the fact that the agency is open to such changes is a warning to
whistleblowers of the unpredictability of the incentives and protections
of the whistleblower program.
Dodd-Frank statutorily mandates that awards be between 10 and 30
percent of the total monetary sanctions collected.197 If more than one
whistleblower contributed to the success of the agency actions against a
violator, and more than one whistleblower is eligible under the rules, the
whistleblowers may have to share the award, but in no case will the total
2–4. The proposed rules were published in the Federal Register in August 2016, and the Final Rules
went into effect on July 31, 2017. Id.
194. In addition to underfunding the whistleblower program, early on, legislators directly
attempted to alter its provisions through proposed legislative amendments. One example is the
Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, passed through the House Subcommittee on Capital
Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises in December 2011. The proposed legislation
sought to undermine several provisions of Dodd-Frank, placing additional reporting and review
hurdles on whistleblowers and increasing opportunities for retaliation against whistleblowers.
Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. (2011). Lobbyists were
unsuccessful during the rulemaking process in persuading the SEC to require that whistleblowers
first avail themselves of internal reporting compliance programs. Had this legislation been
successful, it would have undermined the considered rulemaking process, placing some
whistleblowers at greater risk of retaliation since the anonymity provisions would not be applicable;
it would have undermined the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program because it
would have discouraged some whistleblowers from stepping forward.
195. Press Release, Proposed Amendments, supra note 156. This Article does not address all of
the SEC proposed rules. The agency has, however, proposed some rule changes that would not
undermine the incentives and protections of the program. See, e.g., Whistleblower Program Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702, 34,703, 34,705–07 (July 20, 2018)
(proposing to further define “action” to expressly allow awards based upon monies collected from
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) in federal or
state criminal cases, and to include SEC settlements to address securities violations that do not
involve a judicial or administrative proceeding).
196. Press Release, Proposed Amendments, supra note 156 (discussing the Commission’s
discretion to increase awards).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012).
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award exceed 30 percent.198 In any event, if substantial monetary
sanctions are collected as a consequence of the whistleblower’s claim,
the whistleblower may receive significant rewards in the millions of
dollars.199 In June 2018, the SEC commissioners voted three to two200 to
include a proposed rule change that would permit the commissioners, in
cases yielding at least $100 million in collected monetary sanctions, to
grant an award for less than 30 percent but never less than 10 percent if
they concluded that a lesser award amount would “not exceed an amount
that is reasonably necessary to reward the whistleblower and to
incentivize other similarly situated whistleblowers.”201 The proposed
change to Rule 21F-6 would continue to assess the appropriate percentage
of award based upon the positive and negative factors set forth in Rule
21F-6(a) and (b). But it would add a paragraph (d) that would extend the
SEC’s discretion to adjust potentially extraordinarily large awards based
on monetary sanctions of at least $100 million to consider the “marginal”
value of the actual202 dollar amounts and whether they are reasonably
necessary.203 Within the statutory minimum and maximum percentages,
the Dodd-Frank Act conferred discretion on the SEC to determine the
amount of an award and for the SEC to add relevant factors for
consideration, provided they were established by rule or regulation.204
Dodd-Frank also provided a list of relevant factors the SEC “shall”
consider and instances in which no award would be permitted.205
Concern over extraordinary awards appears overblown given that, in
the agency’s explanation for the proposed rule, it identified only two
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(B).
199. See Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 73,174,
2014 WL 4678597 (Sept. 22, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/3473174.pdf (awarding an estimated $30 to $35 million to a whistleblower); Order Determining
Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 82,897, 2018 WL 1378788 (Mar. 19,
2018) (awarding $49 million to one whistleblower and $33 million to two joint whistleblowers).
200. See Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Statement on Proposed Rules Regarding SEC Whistleblower
Program, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/jackson-statement-whistleblowers-062818 (stating Commissioner Jackson’s opposition
to the proposed amendment to Rule 21F-6 because it introduces uncertainty into the reward
analysis); Stein, supra note 31 (stating Commissioner Stein’s opposition to the proposed
amendment to Rule 21F-6).
201. Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at 34,703,
34,713–16; Press Release Proposed Amendments, supra note 156.
202. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1842–43 (2010).
203. Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at 34,713,
34,713–14.
204. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. at 1842–43.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2).
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covered actions out of 50 awards to 55 individuals that actually collected
monetary sanctions of at least $100 million.206 Given that Dodd-Frank
intended to spur whistleblowers to report securities violations, but only
included the possibility for awards once collected monetary sanctions
reached a minimum of $1 million, it would appear that Congress wanted
to incentivize whistleblowers who were aware of serious violations that
would warrant the agency’s investigative resources. Indeed, as discussed
above, the SEC has had a backlog of award decisions despite the
$1 million threshold.
The Commission’s focus on what award amount is reasonably
necessary to incentivize whistleblowers adds in the risk of arbitrariness
to awards that Congress sought to avoid. The mandatory language, “shall
award,” acknowledges that 30 percent of $100 million is proportional to
30 percent of $1 million, in that investors and the government recover 70
percent of the monetary sanctions at a minimum. There is no reason to
diminish incentives for a whistleblower whose information can lead to
$70 million versus $700 thousand being returned to harmed investors as
well as ending the misconduct that led to violations justifying substantial
sanctions.207 Although speculative, one would expect that a
whistleblower would hold a significant role in an organization to be privy
to the type of information that could lead to monetary sanctions of
$100 million or more.208 Blowing the whistle is very likely to risk that
person’s job, career, and possibly more given that whistleblowers may be
ostracized by their peers, suffer financial hardship through job or salary
loss, and suffer emotional distress due to any of these factors. 209 The
possibility of delayed whistleblower awards adds hardship because the
losses are experienced early, but the rewards arrive much later, if they
206. See Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at
34,714; SEC 2018 REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 9.
207. As one commenter on the proposed rules observed, there is “no legislative limit on the
amount of money an investment bank, Ponzi operator, or public company cooking its books can
steal from investors.” Letter from Harry Markopolos to SEC Comm’rs Regarding Proposed
Amendments to Whistleblower Rules (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1618/s71618-4351184-173304.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Markopolos].
208. See, e.g., Morrell, supra note 104 (“I am a[n] SEC whistleblower who fought the good
fight and lost everything, having been terminated only days after exhausting all internal remedies
under the Company’s ‘Code of Ethics for Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer’.
The resulting personal financial losses and emotional trauma for protesting unlawful behavior and
practices have been devastating and unrelenting with no relief or upside.”).
209. Congress was addressing the sizable investor losses incurred in the years preceding
Dodd-Frank’s enactment, and was likely aware of the hardships suffered by whistleblowers that
attempted to alert internal leadership about securities and commodities violations. See FCIC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 18–19.
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arrive at all.210 Even if acting anonymously, undercover whistleblowing
adds a dimension of stress that is difficult to quantify financially. It would
seem impossible for the Commission to ascertain what is reasonably
necessary in any situation, and that is very likely why Congress gave the
Commission a firm range of 10 to 30 percent. Had Congress wanted to
allow for the added discretion included in DOJ award assessments for the
False Claims Act cited by the SEC in the proposed rules explanation, it
certainly had the opportunity to include it in Dodd-Frank.211
In support of the proposed rule, the Commission also suggests that
$30 million is plenty to live on, if wisely invested, although taxes might
cut some of the benefit,212 but fails to acknowledge the likelihood that
the whistleblower’s attorney will likely receive a percentage of the award
as a fee. Dodd-Frank clearly anticipated that whistleblowers would often
have counsel to aid in presenting a tip, assisting the investigation, and
making an award claim. Dodd-Frank not only provides that a
whistleblower “may” be represented by counsel, it also provides that
anonymous tipsters are “required” to be represented by counsel.213
Indeed, the Commission acknowledges that about 50 percent of the
whistleblowers who have received awards filed their tips anonymously
and took advantage of the protections of anonymity. 214 Persons and
organizations who regularly represent whistleblowers expressed concern
about injecting this added discretion into the awards process, highlighting
that the well-publicized big-dollar awards have spurred whistleblowers
to report violations while at the same time are most likely to have
discouraged bad behavior due to fear of whistleblowers.215
Proposing discretionary caps on awards in extraordinary cases is only
one of the guns aimed at the success of the whistleblower program in the
Commission’s proposed rules. Another proposed rule would narrow the
210. See supra Part III.D; text accompanying notes 145–51.
211. See Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at
34,714 (discussing the DOJ’s approach to determining the amount of an award under the False
Claims Act).
212. Id. at 34,715 (explaining that an individual who receives $30 million would be in the top
99.5 to 99.9 percentile net worth in the United States).
213. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1843 (2010).
214. See Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at
34,715.
215. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr., to Jay
Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4371152-175237.pdf (citing memoranda from various law firms
regarding the need for industry compliance programs due to the large whistleblower award
providing incentives for whistleblowers to report violations to the agency).
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definition of “related action” ostensibly to avoid multiple whistleblower
awards under alternative whistleblower programs but would also
potentially limit the amount of awards.216 Some proposed rules appear to
be benefits that in reality could be bullets, such as opening the possibility
to award whistleblowers in situations where the collected monetary
sanctions do not reach the $1 million threshold.217 Given that the
Commission cannot handle the awards claims processes efficiently at its
current level, opening the door to lower sanctions has great potential to
crowd out the larger cases that presumably harm a greater number of
investors and lead to substantial losses. Until Congress allows for greater
funding of the SEC, it would seem these awards would open the
floodgates to the low-hanging fruit of small-value cases while allowing
the SEC to pad its numbers in its annual reports to Congress with
low-yield cases. The $1 million monetary sanctions floor reflects a desire
to uncover serious violations that are costly to investors and undermine
confidence in financial markets.
In another proposal, the Commission is seeking commentary on what
it describes as “interpretive guidance” to clarify the meaning of
“independent analysis” presently defined in Rule 21F-4 and critical to
assessing the value of information provided by whistleblowers who are
industry analysts and use their skill or special knowledge to bear on
216. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(d) (2018); Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at 34,709–11. See, e.g., Letter from William A. Jacobson, Dir.,
Cornell Sec. Law Clinic, & Basem Besada, to Brent Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Regarding Amendments to the Commission’s Whistleblower Program Rules (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4366409-174879.pdf (asserting that “related
action” rule changes would disincentivize whistleblowing in circumstances where alternative
programs cap awards at substantially lower levels than is sufficient to prompt whistleblowers to
report violations); Letter from Aaron Greenspan, President, Think Computer Found., to Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Regarding Amendments to Commission’s Whistleblower Program Rules (July 17,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4058984-169087.pdf (observing that
aside from claims that could fall under both the SEC and the CFTC programs, many claims are
already limited on a jurisdictional basis and would necessarily be brought under other
whistleblower programs). But see Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for
Capital Mkts., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Regarding Amendments to
the
Commission’s
Whistleblower
Program
Rules
(Sept.
18,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4370851-175223.pdf
(referring
to
the
whistleblower program rules as the “Commission’s bounty rules” and whistleblower rewards as
“bounty payments” while urging the SEC to narrow definitions, increase summary dispositions,
and limit appeals of awards decisions, among other avenues to discourage whistleblowing).
217. For the person observing securities violations at a smaller firm, the challenges, risks, and
costs of blowing the whistle are similar to those observing more costly violations at larger firms.
Thus, this proposal does offer positive benefits in that the rewards would incentivize reporting
sooner rather than waiting for the violations to accumulate high enough to exceed the $1 million
threshold, and would also cushion the personal costs to the whistleblower.
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publicly available information to report potential violations to the
SEC.218 The “independent analysis” whistleblower was included by
Congress in the whistleblower definition to encourage and reward
persons who are not insiders in an organization, such as Harry
Markopolos, who received acclaim for having detected the Bernie
Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2000, years before Madoff confessed to the
crime.219 Markopolos was familiar with the industry as an accountant and
competitor to Bernie Madoff, who recognized suspicious conduct by
Bernie Madoff’s firm, researched it using public documents and efforts
to replicate outcomes, and brought the Ponzi scheme to the attention of
the SEC.220 In that case, the SEC failed to investigate and confirm the
allegation despite significant documentary evidence provided by
Markopolos on several occasions. Years later, when Madoff finally
confessed to the Ponzi scheme, the losses to investors had grown to about
$65 billion.221
“Encouraging ‘analysts’ to aid in Commission enforcement efforts was
one of the major advances in whistleblower protection approved by
Congress in the wake of the disastrous market collapse of 2008.”222
Despite the Commission’s assessment that Markopolos’s Madoff
materials would have been sufficient to garner an award if the SEC’s
suggested interpretation of “independent analysis” were to be applied
today, Markopolos commented in response to the SEC proposal that there
is sufficient gray area in the Commission’s interpretation for “20/20
hindsight” to foreclose an award on the basis that the SEC would have
noticed the misconduct without the whistleblower’s assistance if an
objective standard is not applied.223 Markopolos now investigates
securities violations regularly, and so one could argue that he has an
interest in avoiding a narrowed definition.224 Yet, it would seem that if
218. Whistleblower Program Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 83,557, 83 Fed. Reg. at
34,727–31.
219. Id. at 34,729.
220. Id. at 34,729–30.
221. See Information, United States v. Madoff, No. 1:09-cr-00213-DC, 2009 WL 1055795
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 20, 2009), 2009 WL 596981 (charging Bernard L. Madoff with 11 criminal
counts).
222. Letter from Jane Turner, Chair, Whistleblower Leadership Council, & Frederic
Whitehurst, Chair of the Bd., Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr., to Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-18/s71618-4350890-173302.pdf.
223. Letter from Markopolos, supra note 207.
224. See Brian Ross, Matthew Mosk & Rhonda Schwartz, Bernie Madoff Sleuth Harry
Markopolos Warns of 3 New Ponzi Scams, ABC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016, 10:00 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/bernie-madoff-sleuth-harrypmarkopolos-warns-ponzi-
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one person with expertise in the industry is incentivized to put his skills
to use to detect major fraud, then the whistleblower program is operating
exactly as intended. Rather than shooting down the program’s industry
analyst whistleblowers by narrowing the scope and use of public
information, the SEC should be protecting the program and the investors
who will benefit from industry analysts who detect securities fraud before
reaching Madoff-sized losses.
Whether any of the above threats successfully kill the whistleblower
program remains to be seen, but collectively they erode the program’s
credibility, predictability, and legitimacy. None of these threats are
insurmountable, and some improvement may be available. Congress can
amend statutes to address narrow judicial interpretations and better fund
the agencies. The SEC could develop processes to speed up award
reviews so that whistleblowers can enjoy the offered incentives.225
Finally, the program’s design can be altered by Congress to increase
performance if weaknesses are quickly detected or additional rules stymie
the program’s effectiveness.
IV. REMEDY FOR SUCCESS
All of the above suggests a continuing battle for the success of the
whistleblower program. If it fails in its current form due either to external
or internal factors, one possibility is to amend the legislation to change
the program to add a basis for private litigation, similar to that of the False
Claims Act (FCA).226
In FCA cases, a private individual called the “relator” files a civil
action seeking recovery for losses incurred by the government against
individuals and corporations who submitted false claims for payment of
goods or services in connection with supplying the federal
government.227 Under the statute, the civil action is filed under seal on
scams/story?id=36578436 (explaining how Markopolos now has a private securities fraud
detection business and also remains an advisor for federal law enforcement officials).
225. One possibility is to require enforcement attorneys that work on a case to keep diligent
notes regarding the assistance from whistleblowers, in order to facilitate a more thorough and
informed review by the OWB of whistleblower award claims. Letter from Markopolos, supra note
207, at 7.
226. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012); see also The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf (last visited May 8, 2019)
(explaining how a private individual, called a “relator,” may bring a qui tam action on behalf of the
government).
227. 31 U.S.C. § 3733. See TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE
WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR COMMITTING THE TRUTH 100–01
(2011).
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behalf of the relator and the government, and the government has at least
sixty days in which to intervene and take over the case.228 If it does so,
then the relator’s award is limited to 10 percent.229 The False Claims Act
is different from the SEC whistleblower program or the IRS
whistleblower program in that, if the government does not go forward
with litigation, the whistleblower (the relator) may continue the action on
behalf of the government, called a “qui tam” action.230 If the government
declines to go forward with the case, the relator may bring the case, and
if successful, the judgment is paid to the government, but the relator gets
a larger percentage of the judgment as an award.231 Despite repeated
efforts to dilute the effectiveness of the FCA, it remains a powerful tool
against fraud,232 and the government has recovered over $56 billion
dollars pursuant to the FCA.233
The benefit of qui tam actions is that more money is recovered for the
government, and more resources are devoted to recoveries due to the
228. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(c).
229. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (The government will pay 15–25 percent if it initially accepts
the case and wins; however, if the relator is bringing information from a public source, his recovery
will be capped at 10 percent).
230. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33; see ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM
WHISTLEBLOWER: FROM IDENTIFYING A CASE TO FILING UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 1 (2d
ed. 2009) (“qui tam” is actually derived from a Latin phrase that means “for the king as well as
himself”). The False Claims Act has a storied history, beginning with the Civil War and its
enactment in 1863 in response to material frauds by suppliers to the Union Army. See, e.g., DEVINE
& MAASSARANI, supra note 227, at 100–01; HENRY SCAMMELL, GIANTKILLERS: THE TEAM AND
THE LAW THAT HELP WHISTLE-BLOWERS RECOVER AMERICA’S STOLEN BILLIONS 36 (2004)
(“[C]orrupt profiteering was epidemic. Gunpowder was frequently adulterated with sawdust. Rifles
didn’t fire. At the start of the Civil War, Union uniforms exposed to rain would often dissolve and
fall from the wearer in clots of sodden fiber.”); DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT,
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 3–4 (2d ed. 2004). Efforts to rein in
misconduct were somewhat successful, but the FCA fell into disuse. DEVINE & MAASSARANI,
supra note 227, at 100–01. The FCA was amended in 1986 to protect employees of federal
contractors who proceed under the FCA and the amendments reinvigorated qui tam actions. Id. at
4.
231. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (government will pay 25–30 percent if it initially declines the case
but the relator succeeds anyway); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (the relator will be barred from any share
in the recovery if he is a violator himself); WEST, supra note 230, at 75 (the government will pay
from 15–25 percent in an intervened case, but 25–30 percent in a declined case); FREDERICK
LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES
145–46 (2012) (same).
232. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 230, at 75 (explaining the percentages of awards
whistleblowers may receive).
233. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW: OCTOBER 1,
1986 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2017 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1020126/download (indicating that between 1986 and 2017, settlements and judgments for qui tam
actions totaled over $56 million).
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additional persons willing to risk taking on litigation that could result in
losses to the individual or to benefits for the government, and to a lesser
degree, the individual.234 The statute has the effect of limitless private
attorneys general taking on risk for reward to the government. In practice,
the FCA has proven to be rewarding for the government.235
Among the matters up for study in Dodd-Frank was a requirement that
the SEC OIG study whether Congress should “consider empowering
whistleblowers or other individuals, who have already attempted to
pursue the case through the Commission, to have a private right of action
to bring suit based on the facts of the same case, on behalf of the
Government and themselves.”236 The import of the Dodd-Frank
provision to study a private right of action suggests a qui tam right of
action such as that encompassed in the False Claims Act. 237 The Office
of Inspector General took up the question as part of its larger evaluation
of the SEC’s whistleblower program in early 2013.238 At the time of the
OIG evaluation, the Final Rules for the whistleblower program had only
been in effect seventeen months.239 Unsurprisingly, the OIG’s evaluation
concluded that adding a private right of action would be premature
because it would be a fundamental change in approach that would be
disruptive to the relatively new system.240
If the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs were amended to adapt
some of the FCA provisions, it would provide for the agencies, and
234. See BOESE, supra note 58.
235. See, e.g., Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017
(reporting
on
recoveries in whistleblower suits: “Of the $3.7 billion in settlements and judgments reported by the
government in fiscal year 2017, $3.4 billion related to lawsuits filed under the qui tam provisions
of the False Claims Act. During the same period, the government paid out $392 million to the
individuals who exposed fraud and false claims by filing a qui tam complaint.”); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW: OCTOBER 1, 1987 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 (2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_
Statistics.pdf (over $20 billion dollars recovered through FCA qui tam suits since 1987).
236. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(d)(1)(G), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849 (2010).
237. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(c) (2012) (outlining the process through which
a private person may bring a qui tam action).
238. SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM EVALUATION, supra note 24, at 28–30
(Question 7).
239. On February 18, 2011, the SEC announced the appointment of Sean McKessy to head the
new OWB, which, with a staff of five attorneys, began in May 2011; the Final Rules became
effective August 12, 2011, and the office began receiving tips on August 12, 2011. SEC 2011
REPORT ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 76, at 3, 5.
240. SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM EVALUATION, supra note 24, at 30 (Question
7).
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possibly the DOJ, to have first right of refusal to move forward on a case
that used the information from a whistleblower. The amendment could
retain the whistleblower protections against retaliation and add protection
against pre-taliation to claims brought via 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h) or
through a relator, so long as the relator provided the information to the
agencies or rule-designated recipients prior to any retaliation.241 The
eligibility rules for an award could follow the present rules created for the
SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs242 while providing the potential
to add many more private attorneys general; this would both increase the
likelihood of recoveries and add another level of deterrence to violating
securities laws or commodities laws as the amendment could work
around some of the congressional and agency actions that threaten the
success of the present programs.
Benefits of such an amendment address both internal and external
obstacles. First, agency obstacles of cognitive capture would be less of a
threat, because internal decisions against pursuing investigation or
enforcement based upon alternative priorities or personal reluctance to
pursue cases would allow for an individual to pursue the matter rather
than shut out pursuit entirely. Second, stealth attacks such as
underfunding the agency or under-resourcing the whistleblower program
would be offset in part by private individuals and private resources taking
on the high-quality cases.
Secondary benefits of increased agency enforcement, enhanced
corporate governance oversight, and deterrence are also possible. Access
to private enforcement under an FCA-type regime may spur the SEC and
CFTC to speed up review of award claims to encourage whistleblowers
to report to the agencies rather than expend personal funds to bring a qui
tam case—a win-win for all involved. Moreover, the increased number
of motivated private attorneys general pursuing the public interest and
winning judgments of behalf of the public could spur business, industries,
and the lobbyists they fund to support placing responsibility for
regulating, investigating, and enforcing the securities laws back into the
arms of the agency by ceasing to undermine their effectiveness. Finally,
the threat of numerous lawsuits may motivate businesses to take
employee reports of securities violations seriously, while also deterring
internal actors from violating the law because they understand that any
241. See supra Part III.C.
242. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6), (c)(2) (2012) (defining “whistleblower” and detailing
standards that must be met for whistleblower to be eligible for an award); 7 U.S.C. § 26(a)(7), (c)(2)
(2012) (defining “whistleblower” and describing when an award will be denied).
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employee could be a government informant, or worse, a private attorney
general not subject to cognitive capture or underfunding by Congress.
Under the FCA, the government has the option to take over a lawsuit
filed by a relator, and doing so lessens the overall percentage of the
proceeds of the action or any settlement that the individual may collect.243
Given that the maximum percentage of the proceeds available to a relator
is the same as available for a whistleblower under the Dodd-Frank
provisions (30 percent), and that the minimum proceeds under the FCA
are higher than Dodd-Frank (15 percent compared to 10 percent), it would
seem that adopting a private right of action would be unlikely to sway an
individual’s decision regarding whether to file the case. Even so,
Congress could adjust these award limits so that the minimum proceeds
would be the same whether the whistleblower report violations to the
agency or brings a qui tam action.
Critics of private rights of action under the FCA complain that such
cases attract “unscrupulous bounty hunters” who will not consider
whether such an action is a true benefit to the government and consistent
with agency regulatory goals.244 The FCA addresses these concerns in
some respects by shifting authority over the case to the government if it
decides to step in to pursue the action or by dismissing the action while
it remains under seal; even though the relator remains a party to the
action, the government may dismiss or settle the action notwithstanding
the objections of the relator who initiated the action, and the government
may limit or restrict the person’s participation in the case in reasonable
circumstances.245
Indeed, in 2018, Michael Granston, director of the Department of
Justice Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, distributed a
confidential memorandum to DOJ attorneys listing factors for evaluating
dismissal recommendations in FCA qui tam actions.246 Citing record
increases in FCA qui tam actions, Granston observed that “the
government expends significant resources in monitoring these cases and
243. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012) (explaining that, if the government proceeds with the case,
the relator may receive between 15 and 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement, and
if the government declines the case, then the relator may receive between 25 and 30 percent of the
proceeds).
244. See SEC OIG 2013 WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM EVALUATION, supra note 24, at 28–29
(Question 7).
245. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (defining the rights of the parties in a qui tam action, especially
powers retained by the government to dismiss, settle, or limit the proceedings).
246. See Granston Memorandum, supra note 25, at 1 (suggesting that government attorneys
should dismiss qui tam lawsuits if they do no serve the interests of the government).
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sometimes must produce discovery or otherwise participate” even when
the government chooses against intervention in the cases.247 Recognizing
that the government rarely seeks to dismiss actions, Granston
nevertheless set forth a nonexhaustive list of seven factors to consider as
a basis for dismissal in FCA claims brought by qui tam relators, creating
the list from reasons that had been used successfully previously pursuant
to § 3730(c)(2)(A).248 When the DOJ seeks dismissal in an FCA case, the
relator must receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard on the
motion.249 The FCA does not set forth a standard of review for a motion
to dismiss, and that has led to a split in the circuit courts with at least one
court giving unfettered discretion to the government, and two other courts
applying a burden-shifting rational basis review.250
If the so-called Granston Memo leads to more dismissals by the DOJ,
it could open an opportunity for the US Supreme Court to weigh in on the
standard of review. Moreover, it would suggest another administrative
bullet shot at the war on whistleblowers that extends beyond SOX and
Dodd-Frank. On the other hand, to the extent the memo merely calls
attention to an already existing practice, it would pose no additional risk
to the whistleblower programs if they were to adopt a qui tam private
litigation measure similar to that available under the FCA. If the DOJ is
indicating a plan to affirmatively increase the number of dismissal
motions in FCA cases, it would almost certainly undercut to some degree
247. Id.
248. Id. Granston provided the nonexhaustive list with an explanation of each factor; there are
the seven factors: curbing meritless outcomes; preventing parasitic or opportunistic qui tam actions;
preventing interference with agency policies and programs; controlling litigation brought on behalf
of the United States; safeguarding classified information and national security interests; preserving
government resources; and addressing egregious procedural errors. Id. at 3–7. Granston also
instructed DOJ attorneys to consider talking with the relator prior to filing a motion to dismiss,
noting that “[s]ince January 1, 2012, more than 700 qui tam actions have been dismissed by relators
after the government elected not to intervene.” Id. at 8 n.5.
249. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (explaining that the government may dismiss a qui tam
action as long as the person involved has an opportunity for a hearing).
250. See Granston Memorandum, supra note 25, at 7. Compare Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d
250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the government has “unfettered” discretion in FCA cases
to seek dismissal), with United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.,
151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying a two-part due process analysis that first requires
the government to identify a valid government purpose for seeking dismissal and a rational
relationship between the dismissal and accomplishing the purpose, and if met, then shifts the burden
to the relator “to demonstrate that dismissal is fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or illegal”
(quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990))), cert. denied 539 U.S. 944
(2003), and Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2005) (adopting the Ninth
Circuit standard of review for a government motion to dismiss under the FCA as comporting with
legislative history and a relator’s right to judicial review).
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the effectiveness of any amendment to the whistleblower programs that
adopts similar language to that in the FCA. Even so, DOJ litigation
priorities and practices can change with the political winds, so today’s
memo can be swept away with tomorrow’s refuse leaving a qui tam
option available should Congress choose to adopt it for the SEC and
CFTC whistleblower programs.
CONCLUSION
Given the failure of prior efforts to encourage whistleblowers in the
securities industry, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program is whistling
past the graveyard. Unlike some other aspects of financial reform where
the financial industry undermined the legislation before it was even
enacted,251 the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions to encourage
whistleblowers and protect them against retaliation were significant
improvements on prior programs such as SOX and the pre-Dodd-Frank
SEC program. Nevertheless, continued efforts persist that threaten the
program’s vitality. Should any of those bullets hit their target, one
potential reform, to draw broadly from the False Claims Act’s qui tam
provisions and add a private right of action, could breathe life into the
program and potentially strengthen it.
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower reforms are a positive feature of the 2008
financial crisis because they offer the potential for accountability against
those who violate securities and commodities laws. That so many persons
were aware of misconduct but failed to report it during the years leading
up to the financial crisis suggests that either many members of society are
willing to participate in lawlessness, even when it is not to their personal
benefit, or that many are afraid and stay silent in the face of lawlessness.
Given the high stakes for whistleblowers who may risk their jobs at a
minimum and their careers, families, homes, and sanity in many
circumstances, the effort to protect them from retaliation is an important
step toward imposing a rule of law upon a lawless industry. The awards
offered to such whistleblowers are dwarfed by the potential to
compensate victims, punish offenders, deter misconduct, and restore
confidence in a financial system that has been overrun by corruption and
lawlessness that disregards the welfare and security of financial investors
and the global economy.

251. See Taibbi, supra note 82.

